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MARKET MYOPIA’S CLIMATE BUBBLE
Madison Condon *
Abstract
A growing number of financial institutions, ranging from BlackRock
to the Bank of England, have warned that markets may not be accurately
incorporating climate change-related risks into asset prices. This Article
seeks to explain how this mispricing occurs, drawing from scholarship on
corporate governance and the mechanisms of market (in)efficiency.
Market actors: (1) Lack the fine-grained asset-level data they need in
order to assess risk exposure; (2) Continue to rely on outdated means of
assessing risk; (3) Have misaligned incentives resulting in climate-specific
agency costs; (4) Have myopic biases exacerbated by climate change
misinformation; and (5) Are impeded by captured regulators distorting the
market. Further, trends in institutional share ownership reinforce apathy
toward assessment of firm-specific fundamentals, especially over longterm horizons.
This underpricing of corporate climate risk contributes to the
negative effects of climate change itself, as the mispricing of risk in the
present leads to a misallocation of investment capital, hindering
adaptation and subsidizing future combustion of fossil fuels. These risks
could accumulate to the macroeconomic scale, generating a systemic risk
to the financial system. While a broad array of government interventions
are necessary to mitigate climate-related financial risks, this Article
focuses on proposals for corporate governance and securities
regulation—and their limits. The Securities and Exchange Commission is
currently drafting a rule on mandatory climate risk disclosure. This
Article argues that the SEC should seek out climate expertise through
interagency collaboration and staff hiring, work with auditors and the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, and provide guidance on
climate risk analytics. This Article argues that climate risk disclosure is
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necessary, though alone not sufficient, to address the widespread
disregard of corporate climate exposure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a duo of computer scientists undertook the laborious task of creating a
map of U.S. Internet infrastructure, indicating where cable was laid and where
colocation centers were based.1 Because the whereabouts of this privately-owned
infrastructure is kept secret by telecommunication companies, the researchers spent
years scraping the web for scattered, publicly available information about
infrastructure location.2 When one of the researchers showed the results of his work
to his wife, a climate scientist, she immediately remarked that much of the
1

Alejandra Borunda, The Internet Is Drowning, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 16, 2018,
3:40 PM), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/news-internet-underwatersea-level-rise [https://perma.cc/6KZK-JT42].
2
Id.
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infrastructure was located in coastal regions at risk of being inundated by sea level
rise as soon as the coming decade.3 All three scientists then worked together,
publishing a study showing that thousands of miles of fiber optic cable, and more
than a thousand nodes of key Internet infrastructure, could be underwater in the next
fifteen years.4 The researchers also identified which providers had the most
infrastructure at risk, concluding that AT&T and CenturyLink were the most
exposed to the risks of sea level rise.5
Any investors in these two companies paying attention to the 2018 study were
likely surprised by its findings: neither of these companies’ recent 10K filings, meant
to disclose potential risks to investors, included any mention of sea level rise.6 Their
voluntary reporting of climate risks to the nonprofit CDP similarly omitted any
mention of flood risk.7
***
A growing number of financial experts at institutions ranging from BlackRock,
to McKinsey, to the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission, have reached
the conclusion that markets are not accurately assessing and pricing climate changerelated risks.8 In April 2019, a coalition of thirty-nine central banks recognized that
“there is a strong risk that climate-related financial risks are not fully reflected in
asset valuations.”9 Christine Lagarde recently warned that central bankers “will have
to ask themselves” if they are “taking excessive risk by simply trusting mechanisms

3

Id.
Ramakrishnan Durairajan, Carol Barford & Paul Barford, Lights Out: Climate Change
Risk to Internet Infrastructure, 2018 ANRW 9.
5
Id.
6
CenturyLink, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18926/000001892619000006/ctl2018123110k.ht
m [https://perma.cc/62JP-3SGU]; AT&T, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000732717/000119312519045608/d705958d10
k.htm [https://perma.cc/SJC4-FF9W].
7
In CenturyLink’s 2017 voluntary disclosure of climate risks to the nonprofit Carbon
Disclosure Project (“CDP”), the company made no mention of sea level rise. However, in
2018 it updated its disclosure to acknowledge rising sea levels as a long-term risk with an
impact valued at $2 million. See Lumen Technologies - Climate Change 2018, CARBON
DISCLOSURE PROJECT (2018), https://www.cdp.net/en/formatted_responses/responses?camp
aign_id=62255737&discloser_id=738433&locale=en&organization_name=CenturyLink&
organization_number=31497&program=Investor&project_year=2018&redirect=https%3A
%2F%2Fcdp.credit360.com%2Fsurveys%2Fft9rgfbw%2F15343&survey_id=58150509
[https://perma.cc/KFX6-2LF7] (to access the disclosure information, click “Register” and
create an account, then search “CenturyLink”).
8
See infra Part II.
9
NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FIN. SYS., A CALL FOR ACTION: CLIMATE CHANGE AS
A SOURCE OF FINANCIAL RISK 2 (2019) [hereinafter NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION].
4
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that have not priced in the massive risk that is out there.”10 According to one survey,
93% of institutional investors agree with her that climate risk “has yet to be priced
in by all the key financial markets globally.”11
Yet while the consensus (and evidence)12 grows that assets are mispriced, there
has been less attention paid to diagnosing why that might be; what are these faulty
“mechanisms” that Lagarde says are not to be trusted?13 This Article seeks to explain
how this mispricing can exist at the level of individual assets, disputing academic
claims that climate risks are “already reflected in market price[s].”14 Contrary to
recent arguments in the corporate law literature, there is, in fact, ample reason to
believe that equity analysts “are systematically less able to assess the valuation
implications” of climate risks.15
First, shareholders and analysts currently lack the fine-grained asset-level data
they need in order to make climate-risk assessments.16 A corporation’s location, the
10

Carolynn Look, Lagarde Says ECB Needs to Question Market Neutrality on Climate,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2020, 3:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-1014/lagarde-says-ecb-needs-to-question-market-neutrality-on-climate [https://perma.cc/PS98
-85UJ].
11
Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence Seen as Risks to Investment Asset
Allocation, Finds New Report by BNY Mellon Investment, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2019, 6:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2019-09-16/climate-change-and-artificial
-intelligence-seen-as-risks-to-investment-asset-allocation-finds-new-report-by-bny-melloninvestm [https://perma.cc/L7WT-R2RZ].
12
See infra Section II.A.
13
But see Jakob Thomä & Hugues Chenet, Transition Risks and Market Failure: A
Theoretical Discourse on Why Financial Models and Economic Agents may Misprice Risk
Related to the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, 7 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 82
(2017).
14
Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t)
Create Social Value 24 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 394, 2018),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pd
f [https://perma.cc/3VCP-VD7N].
15
Id. at 23.
16
See infra Section II.B.1. A note on terminology: When “value-relevant” information
about a company is withheld from the market, that information cannot be reflected in share
price, and so prices diverge from “fundamental efficiency,” or the “correct” price, meaning
the discounted present value of expected cash flows from holding the stock. The assertion
that stock prices reflect all publicly available information is the “semi-strong” version of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) (the strong version of the ECMH, that prices
reflect all information, even information kept internal to the firm, has been widely accepted
as untrue). As the following reasons show, this Article argues that with respect to climate
risks, markets are both fundamentally inefficient (not reflecting true underlying value) and
informationally inefficient (not reflecting information that is already publicly known, or
knowable with presently available data and analytical tools). See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of
Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 317 (2014) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman,
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis] (discussing relationship between fundamental
and informational efficiency).
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origins and routes of their supply chains, the sources and quantities of inputs like
water and energy––this is the type of information needed to assess climate risk
exposure but is not the type of information currently disclosed in financial reports.17
Often, the information that corporations voluntarily disclose aggregates data at too
high a level, gives widely varying timescales that make comparison difficult, and
fails to clearly differentiate between exposure and liability.18
Second, market actors continue to rely on risk-assessment methodologies that
are outdated in a climate-changed world.19 They may employ strategies that expose
them to model risk, such as relying on unrepresentative historical records to project
future exposure. And traditional means of risk assessment may ignore latent risks:
The entire capital stock of corporate America was built using engineering
specifications designed to endure certain temperature and weather extremes that may
be regularly exceeded under a climate-changed world. A facility that was built to
withstand a “100-year flood” may now have a much higher likelihood of failure.
Additionally, corporate managers may continue to rely on outdated methods of risk
assessment that suffer from a duration mismatch. Insurance premiums, for example,
can no longer be relied upon to serve as a proxy for the cost of physical risk on a
contemplated project; returns are calculated over many years, but premiums can
change annually to reflect previously unpriced risk.
Third, corporate managers, with an eye toward maintaining a high share price,
have little incentive to discover and disclose information that might reveal their
company’s stock price is overvalued.20 Equity-based compensation and certain
remuneration metrics may encourage managers to focus on the short-term and
neglect to prepare their companies for longer-term climate resilience.21
Fourth, many physical climate risks will occur within the relevant horizon for
valuing securities but outside of conventional risk assessment horizons for

17

See, e.g., NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION, supra note 9, at 30; CLIMATE-RELATED MKT.
RISK SUBCOMM., MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Leonardo
Martinez-Diaz, Jesse M. Keenan & Stephen Moch eds., 2020) [hereinafter CFTC REPORT];
FOUR TWENTY SEVEN, MEASURING PHYSICAL CLIMATE RISKS IN EQUITY PORTFOLIOS
(2017); WORLD BANK & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SPATIAL FINANCE: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD, EQUITABLE GROWTH, FINANCE & INSTITUTIONS
INSIGHT (2020).
18
Infra Section II.B.1.
19
Infra Section II.B.2. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial
Crisis, supra note 16, at 343–44 (discussing how valuation models employed by banks and
ratings agencies failed because they relied on historical housing price data to model future
risk and ignored warnings of high unaccounted-for correlations between assets).
20
Infra Section II.B.3. See, e.g., John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min,
Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. REGUL. 1, 2631 (2020) (arguing that stock-based,
including options-based, executive compensation models incentivize corporate managers to
neglect risk management programs, to the detriment of the long-term value of the stock).
21
Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 7
(2005).
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investors.22 The investors with the longest investment horizons largely follow an
indexing or quasi-indexing strategy—passively holding their funds instead of
spending resources to research firm-specific fundamental values.23 While investors
continue to shift their money into funds with an “environmental, social, and
governance” (ESG) focus, perhaps suggesting an awareness of climate risks, there
is insufficient scrutiny of index providers and their climate-related methodologies.24
Fifth, decades-long disinformation campaigns have intentionally confused
public understanding of the cause and effects of climate change.25 And lessons from
behavioral finance tell us that investors and corporate managers can be slow to
integrate new information, can be irrationally myopic, can overvalue short-term
gains and undervalue longer-term losses—all of which, in the context of climate
change, serves to maintain apathy regarding mitigation investment and long-term
risk avoidance.26
Sixth and finally, shareholders concerned about climate risk have begun to
press for voluntary disclosure from companies, but their efforts face opposition from
corporate management both directly and through industry influence on government
regulators.27 Under the Trump Administration, several agencies took actions to limit
shareholder oversight of climate risks, including blocking requests for climate
disclosure and preventing investors from integrating climate risks into their market
decisions.28
No amount of regulatory or corporate governance intervention can give
shareholders and managers the ability to foresee the future. The outcomes of national
elections, for example, are both largely uncertain and hugely influential in
determining the strength of future climate policy. However, there are actions within
22
See, e.g., MONA NAQVI, BRENDAN BURKE, SVENJA HECTOR, TRICIA JAMISON &
STAN DUPRÉ, ALL SWANS ARE BLACK IN THE DARK: HOW THE SHORT-TERM FOCUS OF
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS DOES NOT SHED LIGHT ON LONG TERM RISKS, TRAGEDY OF THE
HORIZON (2017); cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267 (2012).
23
Infra Section II.B.4.
24
See, e.g., Joe Rennison & Billy Nauman, Vanguard ‘Green’ Fund Invests in Oil and
Gas-Related Stocks, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/fbdb36d0a293-11e9-974c-ad1c6ab5efd1 [https://perma.cc/M4NP-EYMG]; Adriana Z. Robertson,
Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 YALE J. REG. 795,
848 (2019).
25
See, e.g., JANE MEYER, DARK MONEY 251–60 (2017); see generally NAOMI ORESKES
& ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED
THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010).
26
See infra Section II.B.5; see, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–8 n.25 (2003) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127–28
(1974)).
27
See infra Section II.B.6.
28
Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75261 (proposed Nov. 25, 2020) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 55); Brett McDonnell, Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel & Anita
Foerster, Green Boardrooms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. 335, 352 (2021).
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the power of both market actors and government regulators that can help to counter
the unfolding market failure that is the continued neglect of assessing companies’
exposure to foreseeable climate risks. Net global sea level rise over the next fifteen
years, for example, can be predicted with some certainty, and yet market actors
nevertheless seem to disregard these projections when making asset-allocation
decisions.29
The widespread underassessment of climate risk may lead to two undesirable
economy-wide harms: (1) systemic risk to the financial system and (2) the physical
damages stemming from climate change itself, as mispriced equity leads to
misallocation of investment resources.30 If investors fail to demand risk assessment
from companies, managers may be left unpunished by the market when they build
homes and hotels in hurricane-prone regions too close to the shore or build bridges
to withstand a “100-year-flood” based on a grossly unrepresentative historical
record. This mis-investment imposes costs not just on the company and the investor,
but also on the communities harmed by collapsing bridges and hotel evacuees.
Addressing climate-risk neglect will require an array of actions, from regulators
and investors alike.31 The Securities and Exchange Commission, at the direction of
President Biden, has begun to work on proposed rules for mandatory climate risk
disclosure.32 This Article supports this agenda and provides some high-level
guidance on how to design regulation to address the drivers of climate risk
mispricing. Any mandatory climate risk disclosure regime has to meet climate
science where it is. Regulators must pay particular attention to the spatial and
temporal scales of requested disclosures and ensure they are both scientifically
feasible and tailored to industry-specific needs.33 In particular, an overemphasis on
29

Cf. McDonnell et al., supra note 28, at 342–47.
See infra Part III.
31
The work has already begun. See, e.g., Emily Glazer, Companies Brace Themselves
for New ESG Regulations Under Biden, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2021, 9:15 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-brace-themselves-for-new-esg-regulations-underbiden-11610719200?mod=searchresults_pos3&page=1 [https://perma.cc/4EK9-AMVK];
Kate Davidson, Yellen Is Creating a New Senior Treasury Post for Climate Czar, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 12, 2021, 9:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yellen-is-creating-a-new-seniortreasury-post-for-climate-czar-11613138479 [https://perma.cc/25KY-ACEB]; Larry Elliott,
UK to Make Climate Risk Reports Mandatory for Large Companies, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9,
2020), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/nov/09/uk-to-make-climate-riskreports-mandatory-for-large-companies [https://perma.cc/JCL4-N6J3].
32
Public Statement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee on Public
Input Welcomed on Climate Change Discourse (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/
public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures
[https://perma.cc/GGP6-DDG9]
[hereinafter Public Statement, Lee]; Tim Quinson, SEC Takes a Different Route than Europe
on Climate Disclosures, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2021-09-15/the-sec-is-taking-a-different-route-than-europe-on-climatedisclosures [https://perma.cc/4SPT-ESHM].
33
See, e.g., Tanya Fielder, Andy J. Pitman, Kate Mackenzie, Nick Wood, Christian
Jakob & Sarah E. Perkins-Kirkpatrick, Business Risk and the Emergence of Climate
Analytics, 11 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 87 (2021).
30
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false precision provided by complicated models might obscure the usefulness of
other methods of risk assessment and communication.34 This fact should inform how
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decides to structure climate risk
disclosure compliance, including balancing the pros and cons of principles-based
versus line-item disclosures.35 In crafting disclosure regulation, the SEC should seek
out climate-related expertise through interagency working groups, advisory boards,
and staff hiring.36 Further, the SEC should: (1) Require methods for addressing
uncertainty, including scenario analysis; (2) Work with auditors and the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board; and (3) Facilitate disclosure and market
response through public provision of climate-risk analytical tools.37
No amount of disclosure, however, can protect the market from climate change.
The only path toward financial stability requires halting emissions. The CFTC
Subcommittee’s report on Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System
acknowledges this and lists reducing emissions as its first recommendation.38
However, direct regulation is also required to address physical risks and adaptation
deficits, not just mitigation deficits. Climate adaptation requires planning at the
national level. Beyond the “market failure” of emissions externalities, there is a limit
to what increased disclosure can facilitate in the face of systemic risks; climate risks
remain unhedgeable even with increased information.
Part II of this Article proceeds by collecting evidence of climate mispricing,
including empirical studies examining how well the market has priced the 1.1°C of
warming that has already occurred, and models of climate impacts on portfolios. It
then enumerates six distinct drivers of asset mispricing in the climate context and
explains why neither arbitrage nor private ordering through requests for voluntary
disclosures can correct these market failures. Part III argues that there is a societal
interest to correct this mispricing, beyond individual investor protection, as the
inaccuracy may lead to: (1) systemic risk to the financial system and (2) the physical
damages stemming from climate change itself, as mispriced equity leads to
misallocation of investment resources. Part IV discusses recommendations for
regulators and investors. Part V concludes.
II. CLIMATE RISK AND EQUITY-MISVALUATION
Climate risks facing the private sector are typically broken down into three
categories: transition risk, physical risk, and liability risk.39 Transition risk comes
34

Id.
See infra note 293.
36
See Madison Condon, Sarah Ladin, Jack Lienke, Michael Panfil & Alexander Song,
Mandating Disclosure of Climate-Related Financial Risk, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
(forthcoming 2021).
37
See infra Section IV.A.
38
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 123.
39
These are the categories identified by Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of
England. See Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, A Transition in Thinking and
Action (Apr. 6, 2018).
35
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from a failure to adapt in time to a changing, less carbon-intensive economy as
governments begin to regulate emissions and alternative energy falls in price.
“Stranded assets” in the fossil fuel industry are the classic example of transition
risk.40 Physical risks are the threats faced by all industries that come from the
changing climate itself. They include the impact of sea level rise on the real estate
industry, decreased labor productivity from hotter days, reductions in agricultural
output due to droughts or floods, and many others.41 Liability risks are the potential
that the parties that contribute to, or profit from, carbon emissions, will be required
at some point in the future to compensate those harmed by climate impacts.42
Many leaders in the financial sector have voiced their concern that the
industry’s current assessment of these risks is woefully inadequate. Hank Paulson,
former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and CEO of Goldman Sachs, wrote in a
McKinsey newsletter in 2015: “As someone who has spent a good deal of time
40

See Christophe McGlade & Paul Ekins, The Geographical Distribution of Fossil
Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 2°C, 517 NATURE 187, 187 (2015)
(suggesting that “to have at least a 50 per cent chance of keeping warming below 2°C
throughout the twenty-first century . . . globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves
and over 80 per cent of current coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050”);
MARK C. LEWIS, STÉPHANE VOISIN, SUDIP HAZRA, SAMUEL MARY & ROBERT WALKER,
ENERGY TRANSITION & CLIMATE CHANGE: STRANDED ASSETS, FOSSILISED REVENUES 3
(2014) (calculating that if “greenhouse-gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere” are
kept below “450ppm of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) . . . the fossil-fuel industry would stand to
lose [$28 trillion] of gross revenues over the next two decades . . .”); EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK
BD. ADVISORY SCI. COMM., 6 TOO LATE, TOO SUDDEN: TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON
ECONOMY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 2016 [hereinafter EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD.]; Thomas Lee,
Fossil Fuel Stranded Assets: Efficient Market or Carbon Bubble?, PENN WHARTON PUB.
POL’Y INITIATIVE (April 12, 2017).
41
See generally THE RISKY BUS. PROJECT, RISKY BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC RISKS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES (2014) (attempting to quantify the specific costs
businesses will face from climate change through the Risky Business Project, co-chaired by
Michael Bloomberg, former mayor of New York, Henry Paulson, former U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury, and Tom Steyer, hedge fund manager and philanthropist).
42
Lawsuits against emitters are increasing in frequency and gaining more traction in
the courts. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP P.L.C. et al., 388 F. Supp 3d 538
(2019), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020), and vacated, 14 S. Ct. 1532 (2021); Order at 1–
2, Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D. Mass. 2020)
(No. 29) (ruling that an environmental group alleged facts sufficient to establish standing by
claiming that ExxonMobil “is discharging pollutants” and “that there is a ‘substantial risk’
that severe weather events, such as . . . flooding, will cause the terminal to discharge
pollutants . . . .”); Rebecca Hersher, Supreme Court Considers Baltimore Suit Against Oil
Companies over Climate Change, NPR (Jan. 19, 2021, 11:12 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/01/19/956005206/supreme-court-considers-baltimore-suit-agains
t-oil-companies [https://perma.cc/7NZB-NT47] (reporting “more than 20 similar suits
brought by cities, states and counties” against oil and gas companies “in recent years”);
Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz & Radley Horton, The Law and Science of Climate Change
Attribution, 45 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 57 (2020) (discussing attribution science and the role it
plays in climate change law and litigation).
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assessing risk and dealing with crises, I’m struck by the similarities between the
climate crisis and the financial crisis of 2008.”43 The world’s largest asset
management company, BlackRock, agreed:
Many equity investors ignore climate risk, and credit investors and ratings
agencies do not routinely assess it. Real estate markets often ignore
extreme weather risk, even in highly exposed coastal areas. Most asset
owners do not measure their exposure to potentially stranded assets such
as high-cost fossil fuel reserves that may have to be written off if their use
is impaired by climate change regulation. Who can blame them? There is
little evidence that assets more susceptible to climate change and related
regulatory risks trade at a discount to the market.44
In the six years since these statements were made, each of these actors—equity
analysts, ratings agencies, asset owners, and corporate managers—have made slow
progress toward integrating climate change into analyses of financial risks.45
Evaluating climate risk involves forecasting macroeconomic energy demand,
guessing on the success of carbon regulation and future technologies, modeling the
relationship between atmospheric gas concentrations and global temperatures,
predicting how temperature rise will change the earth’s climate systems, and
calculating how those changes impact physical economic assets. The task requires
skills beyond that of a typical financial analyst, colossal amounts of data, and models
that have only begun to be built. Each step of estimation adds layers of uncertainty
to risk projections. In some cases, particularly those longer-term and
macroeconomic, the estimation of the economic impact of climate change may be

43

Henry M. Paulson Jr., Short-Termism and the Threat from Climate Change,
MCKINSEY (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-andcorporate-finance/our-insights/short-termism-and-the-threat-from-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/QP2F-CUKE].
44
BLACKROCK INV. INST., THE PRICE OF CLIMATE CHANGE: GLOBAL WARMING’S
IMPACT ON PORTFOLIOS 6 (2015).
45
See, e.g., Hana V. Vizcarra, The Reasonable Investor and Climate-Related
Information: Changing Expectations for Financial Disclosures, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10106,
10110 (2020) (“In 2019, Moody’s acquired climate data and risk analysis company Four
Twenty Seven, Inc., and MSCI acquired Carbon Delta. Further, S&P Global Ratings
launched the ESG Evaluation program and ESG Risk Atlas designed to inform investors and
companies of risks, including that of climate change. In 2017, Institutional Shareholder
Services acquired the investment climate data division of the South Pole Group.”); Letter
from the American Society of Adaptation Professionals to U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission Chair Gary Gensler, https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll128906783-244143.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XMX-U92G] (reporting that as of 2021 only a few
market participants such as insurance companies, asset managers, and ratings agencies, are
using quantified climate risk metrics, but “[m]ost market participants are not using quantified
information”).
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dwarfed by this uncertainty.46 However, this Article focuses on climate risks at the
scale of individual corporations and investors and their horizons. It argues that the
market is neglecting to respond to foreseeable risks.
A. Evidence of Misvaluation
Evidence that the market is currently under-assessing climate risks comes in
several forms. There are recent attempts by large institutional actors to model the
impact of carbon regulation and climate damages onto a representative market
portfolio. There are also a handful of empirical studies examining how well the
market has priced the climate-related impacts we have already been experiencing.
Added to these relatively scarce forward-looking and backward-looking studies are
abundant anecdotal examples of market actors failing to prepare for climate impacts.
In April 2019, the world’s largest asset manager, BlackRock, released its
investigation into the pricing of physical climate risks in three different categories
of investments: municipal bonds, commercial real estate, and equities of electric
utilities.47 The research was conducted alongside the climate-risk consultant
Rhodium Group and concluded that for each investment type, the market was failing
to price asset exposure to the predictable increase in severe weather events and rising
seas.48 In the case of municipal bonds, the report pointed out, for example, that
declines in crop yields from increased temperatures could be expected to depress the
GDP of many metropolitan areas by multiple percentage points.49 Given cumulative
damage impacts, BlackRock predicts that “within a decade, more than 15% of the
current S&P National Municipal Bond Index (by market value) would be issued by
[metropolitan areas] suffering likely average annualized economics losses of up to
0.5% to 1% of GDP.”50 Nevertheless, when these climate-sensitive bonds are
compared to bonds issued by less climate-vulnerable areas, their valuations do not
reflect this difference in risk.51 In the case of utility companies, it was found that the
equities of more climate-resistant utilities are, in fact, already trading at a slight
premium relative to more vulnerable assets, but that this price difference did not yet
reflect the total risk exposure.52 Similarly, the International Monetary Fund found
that present market-implied equity risk premiums are consistently lower than
46
See PATRICK BOLTON, MORGAN DESPRES, LUIZ AWAZU, PEREIRA DA SILVA,
FRÉDÉRIC SAMAMA & ROMAIN SVARTZMAN, THE GREEN SWAN: CENTRAL BANKING AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2020); Martin L. Weitzman, On
Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 1 (2009); Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 275 (2011).
47
BLACKROCK, GETTING PHYSICAL: SCENARIO ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSING CLIMATERELATED RISKS 1 (April 2019).
48
Id. at 3.
49
Id. at 10.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
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premiums calculated via an asset pricing model that takes temperature-induced
disaster risk into account.53 It concluded that the discrepancy suggests “that equity
markets may not currently price [physical] climate change risk.”54
In an assessment that considered transition risks in addition to physical risks,
the institutional investment advisor, Mercer, modeled how various assets and
industries within a typical portfolio will be impacted under three different warming
scenarios: where the world acts to limit warming by 2100 to 2°C, 3°C, or 4°C.55 For
each scenario, Mercer estimated the portfolio impacts at three different points in the
future, in the years 2030, 2050, and 2100. In a 2°C scenario, which models a world
with aggressive regulation of emissions that reaches net-zero emissions by 2070,
certain sectors suffer a severe decline in returns in the short term.56 Assets in the oil
and gas industry, for example, lose 42.1% of their value by 2030.57 In the 3°C and
4°C scenarios, all sectors other than renewables have negative return impacts to both
2030 and 2050, with annual losses varying from 0.1% to 7.7%.58
Substantial warming has already occurred—around 1.1°C as compared to
preindustrial levels.59 The earth’s planetary systems have reacted to this warming in
manifest and measurable ways, making the economic impacts of climate change a
matter of the present, not just the distant future. A growing number of empirical
studies ask whether the market has efficiently anticipated and priced these changes.
One recent study of publicly-traded food companies in thirty-one countries found
that the market did not efficiently incorporate drought trend impacts on profits into
stock prices and estimated the mispricing to be as much as 7%.60 Another looked at
53

INT. MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKETS IN THE
TIME OF COVID-19, 95 (2020).
54
INT. MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: PHYSICAL RISK AND
EQUITY PRICES—ONLINE BOXES 5.1-5.3 (2020), https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Public
ations/GFSR/2020/April/English/onlinebox51.ashx [https://perma.cc/U9XN-N4LG].
55
See generally MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2019).
56
Id. at 34–35.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 35.
59
Compare Richard J. Millar, Jan S. Fuglestvedt, Pierre Friedlingstein, Joeri Rogelj,
Michael J. Grubb, H. Damon Matthews, Ragnhild B. Skeie, Piers M. Forster, David J. Frame
& Myles R. Allen, Emission Budgets and Pathways Consistent with Limiting Warming to
1.5°C, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 741, 741 (2017) (“Human-induced warming reached an
estimated 0.93 ◦C . . . above mid-nineteenth-century conditions . . . .”), with Laura Millan
Lombrana, Global Temperatures Already 1.2ºC Above Pre-Industrial Levels, BLOOMBERG
GREEN: ENERGY & SCI. (Dec. 2, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article
s/2020-12-02/global-temperatures-already-1-2-c-above-pre-industrial-levels [https://perma.
cc/PPZ5-LKJL] (“Global temperatures from January to October were around 1.2 degrees
Celsius (2.2 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels . . . .”).
60
Harrison Hong, Frank Weikai Li & Jiangmin Xu, Climate Risks and Market
Efficiency, 208 J. ECONOMETRICS 265, 268 (2019); see also Mathias S. Kruttli, Brigitte Roth
Tran & Sumudu W. Watugala, Pricing Poseidon: Extreme Weather Uncertainty and Firm
Return Dynamics (EBRD Working Paper No. 229, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
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the growing frequency of extreme temperature events from 1995 to 2017 and found
that high temperatures reduce revenues and operating incomes of individual firms.61
Further, the greater the heat exposure, the greater equity analysts’ estimates deviate
from actual financial performance.62 The authors conclude from their findings that
“investors do not fully anticipate the economic repercussions of heat as a first-order
physical climate risk.”63 The climate data firm, 427, generates physical climate risk
scores for individual firms based on their exposure to operational disruption risk.64
A recent paper shows that a trading strategy employing 427’s heat stress factor over
the period from 2008–2018—by selling high-risk firms and buying low-risk firms—
would have generated returns of 77%.65
Evidence suggests that the housing market has begun to price in the risks of sea
level rise but that the risk is still undervalued.66 There are reasons to expect these
s.cfm?abstract_id=3451323 [https://perma.cc/VF93-RSDQ] (analyzing volatility risk
premia changes due to hurricanes and finding that investors significantly underestimate the
uncertainty associated with hurricanes, but that the underreaction became less pronounced
after Hurricane Sandy).
61
See generally Nora Pankratz, Rob Bauer & Jeroen Derwall, Climate Change, Firm
Performance, and Investor Surprises (Working Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3443146 [https://perma.cc/EQE7-KFSW].
62
Id.
63
Id. (quoting the article’s Abstract); see also Alok Kumar, Wei Xin & Chendi Zhang,
Climate Sensitivity and Predictably Returns (Feb. 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3331872
[https://perma.cc/56MVDB4Q] (similarly finding that extreme temperature anomalies negatively affect stock returns
and concluding that markets underreact to firms’ climate sensitivities); see also Jawad
Addoum, David Ng & Ariel Ortiz-Bobea, Temperature Shocks and Industry Earnings News,
(May 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3480695 [https://perma.cc/2K5G-SPBQ] (showing that quarterly earnings of firms in
certain industries are negatively affected by extreme heat waves and that analysts’ forecasts
did not fully account for this impact in their earnings forecasts).
64
See generally FOUR TWENTY SEVEN, https://427mt.com/ [https://perma.cc/84TPP9RJ] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
65
Glen Gostlow, Pricing Climate Risk (Dec. 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3501013
[https://perma.cc/YHP9MKCY] (importantly, the paper notes that these returns may be attributed either to
mispricing or to compensation for risk, and that further study is needed); see also Ruihong
Jiang & Chengguo Weng, Climate Change Risk and Agriculture Related Stocks (Dec. 15,
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3506311 [https://perma.cc/U2
9A-JM27]; Mats Andersson, Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, Hedging Climate Risk, 72
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 13 (2016) (employing the Actuaries Climate Index to test for the impact
of physical climate risk on agriculture-related stock returns and similarly finding that a
strategy of buying and selling based on climate risk scores would have generated positive
returns).
66
Markus Baldauf, Lorenzo Garlappi & Constantine Yannelis, Does Climate Change
Affect Real Estate Prices? Only If You Believe in It, 33 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1256 (2020)
(finding that homes vulnerable to sea level rise are priced at a discount only in those
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risks to be ignored in this market in particular, despite the fact that more than
300,000 coastal homes are at risk of chronic inundation by the year 2045, which is
within the lifespan of a 30-year mortgage issued today.67 For one, flood maps made
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are out of date and fail to
capture current flood risks, let alone projected flooding from sea level rise.68 This
means that highly-exposed homes are being covered by government insurance at
heavily subsidized rates.69 For another, in many states, there is no legal requirement
to disclose flood history when selling a home.70 And Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s
governing regulations prohibit them from factoring natural disaster risk into their
pricing of mortgages bought from banks.71
Investors can only price the risks they are aware of, and increasing attention
has been paid to the lack of climate-related risk disclosure, leaving investors in the
dark. There is a large gap between the economy-wide estimates of the impact of

neighborhoods where residents largely believe in the existence of climate change); cf. Asaf
Bernstein, Matthew Gustafson & Ryan Lewis, Disaster on the Horizon: The Price Effect of
Sea Level Rise, 134 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (2019) (finding that coastal homes vulnerable to sea
level rise are priced at a 6.6% discount relative to similar homes at higher elevations, and
concluding that the market must either not fully believe in SLR projections or expect that
cheap mitigation infrastructure will be available and installed to protect against property
damage); Justin Murfin & Matthew Spiegel, Is the Risk of Sea Level Capitalized in
Residential Real Estate?, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 1217, 1219 (2020) (finding valuation impact
that “would arise from an unmitigated 0.27 mm/year average relative sea level rise under
10% discount rates, an order of magnitude lower than the 2.8 mm/year experienced in recent
history,” indicating significant underpricing of risk); Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori,
Krichna Rao, Johannes Stroebel & Andreas Weber, Climate Change and Long-Run Discount
Rates: Evidence from Real Estate (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 21767,
2015), https://www.nber.org/papers/w21767 [https://perma.cc/H8M9-TA7J].
67
Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for US Coastal Real
Estate, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files
/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRE4-7CNP].
68
Kate Duguid, Citing climate risk, investors bet against mortgage market, REUTERS
(Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-mortgages/citingclimate-risk-investors-bet-against-mortgage-market-idUSKBN1WE0D3 [https://perma.cc/
MU9N-UUAC]; Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Is Underwater Because of
Outdated Science, SCI. AM. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
national-flood-insurance-is-underwater-because-of-outdated-science/ [https://perma.cc/Z9
CZ-B5KK].
69
Id.
70
Climate Resilience: How States Stack up on Flood Disclosure, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/flood-disclosure-map [https://perma.cc/23ED-5MQ9].
71
Christopher Flavelle, Climate Risk in the Housing Market Has Echoes of Subprime
Crisis, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), reporting on Amine Ouazad & Matthew
Kahn, Mortgage Finance in the Face of Rising Climate Risk (NBER Working Paper No.
26322, Sept. 30, 2019).
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climate change in the financial sector (ranging broadly from $4.2 to $43 trillion),72
and the cumulative impacts disclosed by individual companies in their financial
reporting. One recent study found that the total value of aggregated financial risk
reported through both voluntary and mandatory corporate disclosures amounted to
mere tens of billions of dollars of potential negative impact—at least two orders of
magnitude smaller than top-down projections of costs to financial assets.73
According to the UN Finance Initiative, public corporations can expect to face about
$3 trillion in climate-related losses in the next 15 years alone.74
One recent example of this under-assessed and undisclosed climate risk comes
from the California wildfires. In 2018, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) voluntarily
disclosed its climate-related risks to the nonprofit CDP (formerly the Carbon
Disclosure Project).75 The company highlighted climate change driven increases in
wildfire risk as a potential liability and estimated its 2017 claim payouts at $2.5
billion.76 Any investor that relied on this information to be a fair predictor of future
liability would be deeply disappointed in January 2019 when PG&E announced it
was filing for bankruptcy and facing $30 billion in wildfire liabilities.77 PG&E’s
share price fell more than 80% in two months.78
Expected damages from the changing climate extend far more broadly across
the economy than mainstream financial news coverage might suggest to the average
investor. With warmer days, labor productivity declines,79 the rate of infectious
72

The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from Climate Change, THE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 41 (Jul. 24, 2015) (reporting $43 trillion loss at high end of
loss estimates, under 6°C of warming, which current consensus suggests we will not reach
anytime in the next century).
73
Allie Goldstein, Will Turner, Jillian Gladstone & David Hole, The Private Sector’s
Climate Change Risk and Adaptation Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18 (2019).
74
U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, CHANGING COURSE 51 (2019) (modeling
a market portfolio of 30,000 companies and calculating value at risk, using a 15-year horizon
under a scenario where warming is limited to 2°).
75
PG&E Corporation – Climate Change 2018, CLIMATE DISCLOSURE PROJECT,
https://www.pgecorp.com/corp_responsibility/reports/2018/assets/PGE_CDP_Climate_Cha
nge_Response_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE23-S5Q3] (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).
76
Brad Plumer, Companies See Climate Change Hitting Their Bottom Lines in the Next
5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/climate/compan
ies-climate-change-financial-impact.html [https://perma.cc/N9LM-GVDD]; CLIMATE
DISCLOSURE PROJECT, supra note 75.
77
Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-firstclimate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006 [https://perma.cc/366P-QJHL].
78
Id.
79
See Tord Kjellstrom, R Sari Kovats, Simon J Lloyd, Tom Holt & Richard S J Tol,
The Direct Impact of Climate Change on Regional Labor Productivity, 64 ARCHIVE ENV’T
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 217, 217 (2009) (concluding that “[w]orkers may need to work
longer hours, or more workers may be required, to achieve the same output and there will be
economic costs of lost production and/or occupational health interventions against heat
exposures”).
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diseases increases,80 energy transmission becomes less efficient,81 wasps nests the
size of cars become more common.82 And yet, when voluntarily disclosing their
environmental risks to CDP, more than 1,000 U.S. manufacturing companies report
they anticipate no climate-related risks.83 The Brookings Institution recently found
that communities exposed to heightened physical risk fail to report that risk in their
municipal bond disclosures.84
B. Drivers of Mispricing
An array of financial regulators share the conclusion that financial markets are
failing to price climate risks, and this conclusion is supported by the growing number
of empirical and model-based studies discussed in the preceding section. Yet, as
critics of “sustainability” investing point out, this conclusion appears at odds with
the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH), which suggests that all known,
or knowable, financial risks are already priced into the market.85 This next section
outlines the drivers of this mispricing, breaking them into six discrete categories: (1)
Lack of asset-level data; (2) Model risk and latent risk; (3) Misaligned incentives of

80

See Arthur Wyns, Climate Change and Infectious Disease, SCI. AM. OP. (Apr. 9,
2020),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/climate-change-and-infectiousdiseases/ [https://perma.cc/S9GR-JDEW] (citing research suggesting climate change is
aggravating the negative health impacts of dengue, malaria, and cholera worldwide).
81
Matthew Bartos, Mikhail Chester, Nathan Johnson, Brandon Gorman, Daniel
Eisenberg, Igor Linkov & Matthew Bates, Impacts of Rising Air Temperatures on Electric
Transmission Ampacity and Peak Electricity Load in the United States, 11 ENV’T RSCH.
LETTERS 114008, 1 (2016) (“As atmospheric carbon concentrations increase, higher ambient
air temperatures may strain power infrastructure by simultaneously reducing transmission
capacity and increasing peak electricity load.”).
82
Mariel Padilla, Officials Warn of Wasp ‘Super Nests’ in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES (June
30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/climate/yellow-jackets-wasp-nests.html
[https://perma.cc/53HG-X7RS].
83
CDP, Major Risk or Rosy Opportunity: Are Companies Ready for Climate Change?
(2019),
https://www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/global-climate-change-report2018/climate-report-risks-and-opportunities [https://perma.cc/53HG-X7RS] (showing that
1041 manufacturing companies report no climate related risk (as compared to 300 reporting
physical risks, 326 reporting transition risks, and 472 reporting both)).
84
Parker Bolstad, Sadie Frank, Erik Gesick & David Victor, Flying Blind: What Do
Investors Really Know About Climate Change Risks in the U.S. Equity and Municipal Debt
Markets?, HUTCHINS CTR. ON FISCAL & MONETARY POL’Y (2020), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/WP67_Victor-et-al.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBL8-JGSC].
85
See, e.g., Brest et al., supra note 14; Armour et al., supra note 20; Editorial Board,
Labor vs. The ESG Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2020, 6:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/labor-vs-the-esg-racket-11605482618 [https://perma.cc/QT3Y-3BC9] (criticizing
Larry Fink’s BlackRock for assuming markets don’t account for political risks like climate
regulation and arguing that alleged “material” risks are “not clearly linked to financial
performance”).
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corporate leadership; (4) Myopic shareholders and market structure; (5)
Misinformation and biases; and (6) Political opposition and regulatory capture.
This Article argues that in some cases, the market is mispricing risks that are
already known, or could be known with present research methods and publicly
available data.86 In other cases, the data needed is unavailable to the market and kept
internal to the corporation.
1. Lack of Asset-Level Data
Shareholders and analysts currently lack the fine-grained asset-level data they
need in order to make climate-risk assessments.87 The type of information needed to
assess climate risk exposure—such as the location of a corporation’s operations, the
origins and routes of their supply chains, and the sources and quantities of inputs
like water and energy—is not the type of information currently disclosed in financial
reports.88 Many climate risks are local in nature, so assets must be evaluated
geospatially.89 Often, however, the climate risk-related information that companies
voluntarily disclose aggregates data at the parent or holding-company level and does
not disclose information specific to subsidiaries or particular assets.90 Corporate
reporting of climate risks is far more likely to come in a qualitative, descriptive form
86

In violation of the semi-strong version of the ECMH. See discussion of different
forms of market efficiency under the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, infra note 181.
87
NGFS, CALL FOR ACTION, supra note 9, at 30 (“In the course of its work, the NGFS
observed, like other institutions and academic papers before, that data scarcity and
inconsistency are substantial obstacles to the development of analytical work on climate
risk.”); see generally WORLD BANK & WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SPATIAL FINANCE:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD EFI INSIGHT-FINANCE (2020).
88
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (“Some financial institutions may have assetlevel data to overlay with physical risk data, for example, a bank providing project finance
loans. However, most finance use cases will not have direct access to asset-level data for
counterparty analysis, let alone analysis of multiple counterparties in a portfolio (such as a
listed equities portfolio).”); FOUR TWENTY SEVEN, supra note 17, at 2 (“To do so, investors
first need to identify the physical locations of the companies they invest in, a task made tricky
by the generally poor corporate disclosure around these topics.”).
89
JONATHAN WOETZEL, DICKON PINNER, HAMID SAMANDARI, HAUKE ENGEL,
MEKALA KRISHNAN, BRODIE BOLAND & CARTER POWIS, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., CLIMATE
RISK AND RESPONSE: PHYSICAL HAZARDS AND SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS 39 (2020)
[hereinafter MCKINSEY GLOB. INST.]; Letter from Jean M. Hynes, Managing Partner & Chief
Exec. Officer, Wellington Asset Mgmt., to Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, SEC (June 11,
2021) (“the lack of location data of their contractors obstructs us from understanding the
climate risk of companies in the textile and clothing industries. Many of these companies
disclose the locations of their direct properties but omit specific location information for the
many other countries in which their production is located”).
90
N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Instituting Proceeding, In the Matter Regarding the
Need for Reporting Risks Related to Climate Change, No. 20-M-0499, at 3 (Oct. 15, 2020),
http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B0FFF1374-0
511-41AC-8262-56BED5FAC8CC%7D [https://perma.cc/6T8Q-J6RU].
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than a quantitative one.91 And their assessment of risks occur at widely varying time
scales.92 Further, many current models of climate risk fail to clearly differentiate
between exposure and liability.93 They may be able to describe that an asset is in a
floodplain and exposed to hurricane risk, but they don’t assess how resilient the asset
will be to a hurricane. Have the operators of the asset made investments in climate
adaption already? Is the asset relatively invulnerable?94 More resilient than industry
peers?
While companies have access to information regarding their own assets, they
may be exposed to significant supply-chain risk. This risk may be impossible to
evaluate without disclosure of the location and resilience of the facilities of suppliers
and distributors.95 Corporations may rely on key infrastructure, like roads and water
utilities, that have unaddressed climate risk exposure, yet have operators who lack
the resources or the mandate to even evaluate it.96
2. Outdated Means of Risk Assessment: Model Risk, Latent Risk, and Duration
Mismatch
The traditional methods by which market actors assess risk may be particularly
prone to failure in a climate-changed world. Financial models, including those
impacting capital-allocation decisions within corporations, often rely on historical
data to make future risk projections.97 In the climate context, the future will look
91
Goldstein et al., supra note 73; Bolstad et al., supra note 84, at 11 (reporting only 2%
financial reports from the world’s largest 250 firms quantified climate risks and only 3%
“discuss if or how they use scenario analysis to model risk”).
92
Bolstad et al., supra note 84, at 18.
93
Asset-level data conference; CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 58 (“While an
ecosystem of climate data is emerging, much of the advances in measuring and evaluating
asset exposure have not been accompanied by corresponding advances in evaluating the
sensitivity of exposed assets or the adaptive capacity of firms to manage sensitivity and
exposure.”).
94
See generally WORLD BANK GRP., THE ROLE OF DESALINATION IN AN INCREASINGLY
WATER-SCARCE WORLD (2019) (describing destination plants as an important asset to make
communities resilient to climate change but not discussing the vulnerability of the plants
themselves).
95
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 89, at 32.
96
Sarah Whateley, Jeffrey D. Walker & Casey Brown, A Web-Based Screening Model
for Climate Risk to Water Supply Systems in the Northeastern United States, 73 ENV.
MODELLING SOFTWARE 64, 64 (2015) (describing that “small-scale [privately owned] water
utilities in the northeastern United States that may lack the resources for detailed climate
change risk investigations”).
97
Patrick Temple-West, When Climate Change Threat to Weather Needs a Stilted
Response, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/80547020-bdbf-11e99381-78bab8a70848 [https://perma.cc/X9CE-SY8C]; MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note
89, at 114 (“reliance on historical data or ‘worst case’ expectations based on experience to
relying on climate modeling tools to prepare for the future, including building new analytics
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very different from the past in myriad ways. Historical data representing a relatively
stable climate past cannot be relied upon to predict future risks.98 Future expected
risk has to be creatively modeled—a challenge given uncertainties regarding
emissions levels, future regulation, changes to the earth’s ecosystems, and
socioeconomic feedbacks.99 The failure to adjust risk assessment methods for
corporate decisions like crop selection, or the location and resilience of
infrastructure, is one example of model risk.100
Another type of model risk associated with climate change is failure to capture
extreme unprecedented events. For example, one standard measure that portfolio
managers use to estimate potential losses is value at risk (VaR). VaR provides a level
of confidence, such as 95% or 99%, that an expected loss will fall within a certain
range. But VaR says nothing about the potential magnitude of loss for the extreme
event that has a 1% chance of occurring. Given that certain climate risks are highly
capabilities”); see also Colin Raymond, Radley M. Horton, Jakob Zscheischler, Olivia
Martius, Amir AghaKouchak, Jennifer Balch, Steven G. Bowen, Suzana J. Camargo, Jeremy
Hess, Kai Kornhuber, Michael Oppenheimber, Alex C. Ruane, Thomas Wahl & Kathleen
White, Understanding and Managing Connected Extreme Events, 10 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 611 (2020).
98
See generally BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46.
99
While a challenge, insurance companies and other firms are increasingly turning to
specialized private providers of climate forecasts, like Jupiter Intelligence. See Mary
Franklin Harvin, How Climate Prediction Tech Is Reshaping the Insurance Industry, KQED
(Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.kqed.org/news/11788645/how-climate-prediction-tech-isreshaping-the-insurance-industry [https://perma.cc/N9JX-J82Q].
100
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 89, at 31–34. Firm managers make decisions
about how to allocate their companies’ capital to future investment projects by evaluating
the expected future returns of these projects. To do this, they must account for how risky the
project is, but current mainstream financial methods of evaluating this risk are not welladapted to a future of climate extremes. The most common method used for assessing a
potential investment is to calculate its net present value by summing all expected future
returns over the lifetime of the project and discounting them by the risk-free rate (which
represents the time-value of money) and a risk-premium, meant to account for riskiness of
the project. This risk premium is rarely assessed by forward looking asset-specific analysis
of risk, and instead is typically captured by backward-looking measures of past risk, often
assessed at the company (rather than asset) level. See Mohsen Taheri, Mehdi Irannajad &
Majid Ataee-pour, Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Estimation for Evaluating Mining Projects,
4 FINSIA J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 40 (2009) (describing CAPM as the “main method” for
estimating the risk-adjusted discount rate for mining projects). For example, one common
method of approximating the appropriate risk premium is to calculate the cost of capital of
similar firms in the same industry relative to the market. This calculation is often done using
long term averages of the firms’ stock prices. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social
Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Price, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1040 (1992). In a world of climate
change, however, past risk is no longer representative of future expected risk. Approximating
a risk premium that accounts for expected climate risk is more challenging, as it requires
more information than historical financial data. See, e.g., M. Onischka, Environmental and
Climate Risks in Financial Analysis, 108 WIT TRANSACTIONS ON ECOLOGY & ENV’T 75
(2008).
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uncertain, and potentially catastrophic, they may lie in this 1% zone that is likely to
be discounted by market actors as “unlikely.”101 This “fat-tail risk” deviates from
the normal distribution that market actors may be accustomed to relying on in their
models.102
A further potential for model risk comes from misjudging not only the increased
frequency and severity of extreme climate events, but also their correlation.103 Large
multinationals, like PepsiCo, have operations located around the globe, and their
size may factor into their traditional approach to risk management: it has been
historically unlikely that a hurricane will hit operations in Brazil, Florida, and India
in the same season.104 Due to climate change, these physical risks may cluster in
time and correlate across geographies in new and unanticipated ways.105 Recent
studies, for example, have highlighted the increasing, yet still largely unanticipated,
chance for simultaneous temperature- and weather-induced crop failures in key
breadbaskets around the world.106 Lael Brainard, Board Member of the Governing
101

BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 21 (“Moreover, climate-related risks typically fit
fat-tailed distributions and concentrate precisely in the 1% not considered by VaR.”); see
also Raymond et al., supra note 97.
102
VIVIAN DÉPOUES, VINCENT BOUCHET, MICHEL CARDONA & MORGANE NICOL,
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH IN FINANCE TO CLIMATE RISKS: TAKING
UNCERTAINTIES FULLY INTO ACCOUNT, INST. CLIMATE ECON. 6 (2019) (pointing out that
“traditional approaches to risk management in the banking sector” rely on “historical data
and on assumptions of normal distributions”); see also Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic
Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1619, 1653
(2015) (noting that an estimated 70% of trading that occurs in the market is algorithmic or
“quant” trading and these trades are based on models programmed to guess where the price
will go in the relative short-term typically relying on backward-looking historical data. These
models are “particularly prone to fail when confronted by new and abnormal events”)
(“Catastrophes are difficult and costly to include in programming.”).
103
Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis, supra note
16, at 343–44 (discussing how valuation models employed by banks and ratings agencies
failed because they relied on historical housing price data to model future risk and ignored
warnings of high unaccounted-for correlations between assets).
104
See, e.g., CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 33 (“Research suggests that bigger banks
may be better able to offset temporary regional losses from natural disasters with earnings
from other regions.” (citation omitted)).
105
See, e.g., L. Bonnafous, U. Lall & J. Siegel, An Index for Drought Induced Financial
Risk in the Mining Industry, 53 WATER RES. RSCH. 1509, 1515 (2017) (showing that “spatial
and temporal correlation in the frequency of climate extremes leads to tail portfolio risk that
may . . . be substantially greater than expected from treating each asset as an independent
exposure”); John Schwartz, ‘Like a Terror Movie’: How Climate Change Will Cause More
Simultaneous Disasters, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/
climate/climate-disasters.html [https://perma.cc/EM8E-KXHY].
106
Andrew Freedman, Extreme Weather Patterns Are Raising the Risk of a Global
Food Crisis, and Climate Change Will Make This Worse, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2019)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/12/09/extreme-weather-patterns-are-raisin
g-risk-global-food-crisis-climate-change-will-make-this-worse
[https://perma.cc/YAF3LXYV].
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Board of the Federal Reserve, has noted this potential for unforeseen climate risk
correlation and its resemblance to the 2008 mortgage crisis.107
Additionally, traditional means of risk assessment may ignore latent risks: The
entire capital stock of corporate America was built using engineering specifications
designed to endure certain temperature and weather extremes that may be regularly
exceeded in a climate-changed world.108 A facility that was built to withstand a “100year flood,” for example, may now have a much higher likelihood of failure.109 Tens
of thousands of steel bridges in the United States, for example, were built with
design specifications for expansion and contraction based on estimated temperature
extremes that are now expected to be surpassed.110 The businesses (and their
shareholders) whose supply chains rely on these bridges are likely unaware of their
heightened risk exposure. Climate change exacerbates the already fragile state of
America’s aging infrastructure: more than 15 thousand dams (a majority of which
are privately owned) have a “high-hazard” potential and 9–25% of bridges are
structurally deficient without any consideration of climate impacts.111
Finally, some corporate managers, especially those of mid-sized or smaller
firms, are accustomed to relying on third-party insurance products to assess and price
their company’s risk exposure, rather than internal statistical risk management.112

107

Lael Brainard, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Address at the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s “The Economics of Climate Change” Research
Conference: Why Climate Change Matters for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (Nov.
8, 2019) (transcript available in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
108
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 89, at 49.
109
See, e.g., Reza Marsooli, Ning Lin, Kerry Emanuel & Kairui Feng, Climate Change
Exacerbates Hurricane Flood Hazards along US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts in Spatially
Varying Patterns, 10 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 1 (2019) (finding that “100-year” flood events
on the east coast will increase in frequency, to as much as annually or once every 30-years,
depending on the region).
110
See Susan Palu & Hussam Mahmoud, Impact of Climate Change on the Integrity of
the Superstructure of Deteriorated U.S. Bridges, 14 PLOS ONE 1, 7–8 (2019); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND
EXTREME WEATHER 8–16 (2013) (demonstrating that the United States’ average temperature
is increasing, a trend which is expected to continue).
111
AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: A
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 27 (2017) (listing 9.1% of
bridges as structurally deficient); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE: INFORMATION ON BRIDGE CONDITIONS 2 (2015)
(stating that nearly 25% of bridges are deficient, with 10% categorized as structurally
deficient and 14% categorized as functionally obsolete).
112
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 89, at 114 (pointing out that “statistical risk
management is often not part of ordinary processes in industrial companies”); cf. Zac J.
Taylor, The Real Estate Risk Fix: Residential Insurance-Linked Securitization in the Florida
Metropolis, 52 ENV’T PLAN. A: ECON. & SPACE 1131, 1133 (2020) (demonstrating “a strong
tendency among . . . elected officials, planners, and real estate interests[] to assign re/insurers
great responsibility for managing [Florida’s] climate risk”).
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But insurance premiums are typically re-assessed and paid on an annual basis.113 In
a world of non-linear climate responses, the price of insurance may dramatically
skyrocket from one year to the next, and certain assets may become uninsurable
altogether.114 Relying on insurance to price risks of investments that are expected to
reap returns decades into the future leads to a “duration mismatch”115 that may leave
these assets stranded without insurance, leading to unrecoverable losses in the event
of a disaster.116
3. Misaligned Managerial Incentives
Corporate managers have access to their firms’ operational data and are likely
better positioned, as compared to their shareholders, to assess their firms’ resilience
to climate change. However, they may lack personal incentives for seeking out and
assessing climate risk, let alone disclosing potential risk exposures to the market.117
The revelation that a firm is exposed to previously unaccounted-for climate risks
may lead to a fall in share price that managers are trained, and incentivized, to
avoid.118 In some cases, adapting to climate change requires up-front capital
expenditures in order to stave off longer-term losses—like the raising or relocation

113

TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, 2019 STATUS
REPORT 17 (“Since most of the re/insurance contracts with our clients have a duration of one
year, we can thus adequately price natural catastrophe risks by updating our models to reflect
the current climate.”).
114
See Jessica Shankleman, Growing Climate Risks May Be ‘Impossible to Model’ –
and Ultimately Uninsurable, INS. J. (Nov. 13, 2017) https://www.insurancejournal.com/new
s/national/2017/11/13/470949.htm. [https://perma.cc/7K7C-3EMG].
115
See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG
RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 33–46 (2010)
(stating the term duration mismatch typically refers to when a company’s liabilities are not
closely linked in time with its assets in the United States).
116
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., supra note 89, at 66; see also Bank of England Prudential
Regulation Authority, Transition in Thinking: The Impact of Climate Change on the UK
Banking Sector (Sept. 2018), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential
-regulation/report/transition-in-thinking-the-impact-of-climate-change-on-the-uk-bankingsector.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6XF-JXF2] (arguing that while banks are aware that flood risk
will increase, few have modelled effects on insurance premia of increased flood risk).
117
See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 20, at 26–31 (arguing that stock-based, including
options-based, executive compensation models incentivize corporate managers to neglect
risk management programs, to the detriment of the long-term value of the stock); see also
Anat R. Admati, A Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance, 31 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 131, 133–134 (2017).
118
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Watcher, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 710–11 (2010).
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of facilities. But managers whose performance is measured by stock price set by a
myopic market are discouraged from making these investments in the short term.119
The reasons why managers may focus on keeping stock price high in the short
term, even if that means sacrificing longer-term fundamental value, have been well
explored in the literature. A drop in stock price may open up a manager to the risk
of being fired,120 so in the interest of self-preservation, the manager may focus on
the demands of myopic shareholders while neglecting to spend resources assessing
and mitigating longer-term risks to the company.121 Further, executive remuneration
is regularly linked with short-term metrics of firm performance, including through
compensation in stock or stock options.122 Evidence suggests that the shorter the
time CEOs have to wait before their options vest, the more likely they are to cut
investment budgets, personally profiting from the market’s interpretation of shortterm increases in earnings.123 John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon, and Geeyoung Min
show how options compensation, which becomes worthless if the stock falls below
the strike price, mutes managers’ personal exposure to downside risk.124 Because
managers are indifferent to the difference between a “bad” and a “worse” event, they
are likely to ignore “insurance against low-probability high-impact events.”125
If cutting costs are not enough to meet earnings targets, managers may engage
in “earnings management,” a euphemism for accounting manipulations such as
shifting expenditures to later quarters and revenues to earlier ones.126 Earnings
manipulation is just one example of managers undertaking “signal jamming,” or the
119

Cf. Armour et al., supra note 20, at 24 (making analogous argument with respect to
compliance programs, showing that up-front investment in compliance is shown on disclosed
financial statements, while future benefits, both discounted and uncertain, are poorly
reflected); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 183–85 (2004).
120
See, e.g., Tim S. Campbell & Anthony M. Marino, Myopic Investment Decisions
and Competitive Labor Markets, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 855, 855–58 (1994); see also Bengt
Holmstrom & Joan Ricart I Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital Management, 101 Q.
J. ECONS. 835, 848–50 (1986).
121
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1088 (2007).
122
See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 119, at 137–38; Steven N. Kaplan, CEO
Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9–11 (2013); Admati, supra note 117, at 133.
123
Tomislav Ladika & Zacharias Sautner, Managerial Short-Termism and Investment:
Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting, 24 REV. FIN. 305, 305 (2020); see Alex Edmans,
Vivian W. Fang & Katharina A. Lewellen, Equity Vesting and Investment, 30 REV. FIN.
STUDS. 2229, 2262–63 (2017); see also John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva
Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. &
ECONS. 3, 32–35 (2005) (stating that 80% of corporate executives admitted that they would
decrease discretionary spending in areas such as research and development to meet quarterly
earnings targets).
124
Armour et al., supra note 20, at 20–21, 25.
125
Id. at 25.
126
See generally Dallas, supra note 22, at 296–97.
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massaging of financial metrics used by investors to assess risk.127 The coal company,
Peabody Energy, may already provide an example of such agency costs in the
climate context. In 2015 the New York attorney general announced it had reached a
settlement with Peabody after an investigation revealed the company had withheld
information from investors about the risks of future declining coal demand.128 While
Peabody’s “disclosures denied its ability to reasonably predict the future impact of
any climate change regulation on its business . . . the company and its consultants
[internally] projected severe impacts from certain potential regulations that would
materially affect Peabody.”129 In another example of potential managerial
manipulation, the SEC is investigating the claim of an Exxon whistleblower that the
company deceptively overvalued one of its largest oil assets and forced out
employees who objected to the figure as unrealistic.130
Equity-overvaluation can drive managers to preference short-term performance
metrics over long term value-creation in an effort to meet market expectations.131
Michael Jensen has argued that in order to live up to the expectations of an overvalued stock price, managers spend money on schemes that destroy long-run value
but “mask the inherent uncertainty in their businesses.”132 In his model, executives
sometimes spend money on investments that are not net-present-value justified, just
to keep up the appearance of growth and the promise of future profits.133 This
127

Id.; Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth About the Budgeting
Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379, 387 (2003).
128
Press Release, N.Y. State Off. of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Secures
Unprecedented Agreement with Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose
Risks Arising from Climate Change (Nov. 9, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2015/agschneiderman-secures-unprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading
[https://perma.cc/QMP9-CFSL].
129
Clifford Krauss, Peabody Energy Agrees to Greater Disclosures of Financial Risks,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015) (quoting settlement documents between SEC and Peabody
Energy),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/business/energy-environment/peabodyenergy-agrees-to-greater-disclosures-of-financial-risks.html [https://perma.cc/68J7-HZHA].
130
Christopher M. Matthews & Emily Glazer, Exxon Draws SEC Probe over Permian
Basin Asset Valuation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2021, 8:17 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
exxon-draws-sec-probe-over-permian-basin-asset-valuation-11610716622 [https://perma.cc
/FT5Q-8GE2].
131
See Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment,
38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 335 (1990) (“There will be an especial tendency to overinvest with
respect to those unusual investment projects which generate large negative cash flows in the
long term. The manager might not care as much about the costs which arise after he retires
or leaves the firm. He might not care [for example] about the restoration expenditures after
strip mining . . . . ”).
132
Jensen, supra note 21, at 7.
133
Id. at 10; see also Kahan, supra note 100, at 1030–31 (describing a manager’s
attempt to “adapt” to a market misvaluation by pursuing strategies that result in overvaluation
even though “pursuing business plans favored by the market even if they are not
profitable . . . is obviously undesirable”). Under this view, stock buybacks, rather than
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“overvaluation trap,” argued by Roger Martin and Alison Kemper, describes the
decisions of oil executives to spend hundreds of billions of dollars, each year, on
prospecting for new reserves, despite there being a fifty-three year supply of oil
contained in the world’s existing two trillion barrels of reserves.134 Oil companies
derive most of their net present value from the future promised profitability of their
reserves.135 Any acknowledgment on the part of executives that these reserves may,
in fact, not be worth bringing to the surface in a future world with stricter climate
regulation and more competition from renewables will lead to a decline in stock
price. For example, in 2004, under pressure from regulators, Shell downwardly
adjusted its estimated proven reserves by 20%, and share prices fell 10%.136 The
practice of fossil fuel companies continuing to predict future cash flows from
reserves that will likely be left undeveloped in an emissions-regulated world is
consistent with these practices.137
Some industries have adapted their compensation structures to counteract the
general underinvestment pressure of short-termism, but these metrics may
incentivize the wrong kind of long-term goals, reinforcing mispricing. In the fossil
fuel industry, for example, many companies have policies that tie executive bonuses
to the “reserves replacement ratio,” meaning the amount of reserves added relative
to the amount extracted that year.138 This metric, along with the common practice of
inflating shares, makes them fall, as investors interpret buybacks as a signal that the company
does not have anything better to spend the money on.
134
Roger L. Martin & Alison Kemper, The Overvaluation Trap, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec.
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/the-overvaluation-trap [https://perma.cc/H2M8-WDVS].
135
Analysis from McKinsey & Co. and Oxera and the Carbon Trust has shown that
more than half of oil and gas companies’ valuation is based on anticipated cash flows more
than ten years in the future. CARBON TRUST, CLIMATE CHANGE – A BUSINESS REVOLUTION?
13 (2008).
136
John Carey, Christopher Palmeri & Stanley Reed, Shell: The Case of the Missing
Oil, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 26, 2004), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article
s/2004-01-25/shell-the-case-of-the-missing-oil [https://perma.cc/W2CU-ZFJB].
137
See CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, MEASURING COMMITMENT TO CLIMATE GOALS
(2019) (identifying $50 billion of investment since 2018 in major fossil projects that
undermine climate targets and warning that oil and gas companies risk wasting $2.2 trillion
by 2030 if they base investment decisions on current emissions policies announced by
governments).
138
Compare Sarah Anderson, Chuck Collins & Sam Pizzigati, Money to Burn: How
CEO Pay Is Accelerating Climate Change, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES 1, 13 (2015),
https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/EE2015-Money-To-Burn-Upd.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B8AG-9TZW], and ExxonMobil, Notice of 2015 Annual Meeting and Proxy
Statement (Form DEF 14A), 26 (April 14, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/34088/000119312515128602/d855824ddef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/4Z7B-TE3M] (citing
the successful drilling of the first exploration well in the Russian Arctic as a basis for
executive compensation decisions), with ConocoPhillips, 2017 Proxy Statement 86 (citing
the removal of the reserves replacement ratio metric from the compensation incentive
program as part of the company’s long term strategy for adapting to climate change), and
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linking incentives to exploration and production rather than revenue, is meant to
encourage investment in capital projects that may not generate revenues for many
years.139 At ExxonMobil, for example, 23% of executive pay is tied to metrics that
directly incentivize growth in reserves and production, and another 23% is tied to
“indirect growth” metrics like earnings and cash flow.140 But these metrics are now
out of synch in a world where long-term capital would best be served by not adding
to likely unprofitable reserves.
4. Market Structure Limits Shareholders Demand for Risk Assessment
The ECMH rests on the assumption that the buyers and sellers in a market are
actively seeking out relevant information on a firm’s fundamental value in order to
profit off of any misvaluation.141 But the past few decades have seen innovation in
the capital markets that suggest investors are following a different methodology than
what we traditionally think an investor does (i.e., learning about a company to
predict future profits and trading on that information). The corporate governance
literature contains a voluminous debate about whether short-term focused hedge
funds pressure corporations to be myopic, and if so, whether their longer-term
counterparts—institutional investors like asset managers and pension funds—serve
as a counteracting force to this short-termism.142 But this debate has largely failed to
grapple with another difference (besides horizon) between long-term institutional
Simon Bowers & Harry Davies, Oil Company Bosses’ Bonuses Linked to $1tn Spending on
Extracting Fossil Fuels, GUARDIAN (May 25, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2015/may/25/oil-company-bosses-bonuses-1tr-spending-fossil-fuels [https://
perma.cc/99BS-74X7].
139
See CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, PAYING WITH FIRE: HOW OIL AND GAS
EXECUTIVES ARE REWARDED FOR CHASING GROWTH AND WHY SHAREHOLDERS COULD GET
BURNED 20 (2019) (finding that out of 40 of the largest listed oil and gas companies in the
S&P Global Oil Index, 32 had growth incentives based on production levels, 27 linked
compensation with reserves, resources, drilling inventor, and acreage metrics, and 24
included both).
140
CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, GROUNDHOG PAY: HOW EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES
TRAP COMPANIES IN A LOOP OF FOSSIL GROWTH 18 (2020) (finding that 90% of oil and gas
companies directly reward executives for production or reserves increases in some shape or
form and recommending that “growth neutral” metrics be used instead, such as “return on
average capital employed”).
141
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. R. 393, 403–04 (1980).
142
Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (2015) (“Most importantly, there is
no evidence that activist interventions produce short-term improvements in performance at
the expense of long-term performance.”), with Leo E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the
Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange
Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017) (“[T]hose who manage
active funds are likely to have compensation arrangements more based on the fund family’s
profit’s or short-term returns than the long-term returns of the funds they manage.”).
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investors and short-term focused hedge funds and quant traders: the former are
increasingly quasi-indexers who “passively” buy and hold baskets of assets, while
the latter make frequent firm-specific trades. Even if institutional investors are able
to promote long-termism through governance measures and oversight of
management, it is still active investors trading on the margins that determine share
price.
One piece of evidence for short-termism in the equities market is decreased
demand for longer-term risk analysis. While roughly 80% of the net present value
of a long-term investor’s portfolio is based on cash flows expected beyond the fiveyear horizon, most equity analysts buy or sell recommendations using risk analyses
that fall within the three to five year mark.143 Some of the sectors that are likely to
be the most exposed to long-term climate risks, like utilities and real estate, have the
largest percentage of their net present values derived from expected cash flows that
extend more than 20 years into the future.144 One recent survey asked equity analysts
why there was such a focus on the short term, despite the fact that most equity is
now held by “long term” investors.145 The analysts reported that disconnect was due,
in part, to lack of demand from investors.146
Weak investor demand for long term risk analysis may be explained, in part, by
the rise in short-term trading.147 In 1960, the average share of stock was held for
eight years and four months.148 Current estimates of average length of share holdtime range between four and eight months,149 with hedge fund holdings averaging

143

NAQVI ET AL., supra note 22, at 5–6.
2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, HIT AND MISS: ABOUT TCFD DISCLOSURE
GUIDANCE FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 8 (2017).
145
NAQVI ET AL., supra note 22, at 5 (explaining that retirement funds and insurers have
long term liabilities and are “supposed to optimize their return on a 15- to 30-year horizon”).
146
Id. at 39 (reporting the other three reasons as (1) lack of data, (2) sophisticated longterm risk assessment is expensive and (3) methodological obstacles).
147
ERNST & YOUNG, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE vi (2020); cf. Mark Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse Fried & Charles Wang, The
Sustainable Corporate Governance Initiative in Europe, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY 133, 147 (2021) (arguing that this assertion is flawed as it misses the fact that
“shares are increasingly owned by longer-term investors, even while the remaining shortterm investors trade increasingly frequently and thus drive up the average turnover rate”).
While Roe et al. are correct in their assessment of how this might affect corporate governance
(managers are beholden to short- and long-term investors alike), it does not address how this
dynamic is likely to affect myopic pricing.
148
Warren Fiske, Mark Warner Says Average Holding Time for Stocks Has Fallen to
Four Months, POLITIFACT (July 6, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2016/jul/
06/mark-warner/mark-warner-says-average-holding-time-stocks-has-f/ [https://perma.cc/9
GUM-R76S].
149
Id.; 2 DEGREE INVESTING INITIATIVE, THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD 11 (2017)
(finding that the average share replacement rate for equity fund managers was 1.7 years).
144
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four and a half months.150 When investors hold stock for shorter periods of time,
there is less demand for long-term risk analysis: the stock analyses are made
considering performance projections over a much smaller window of time. The
decision to buy or sell becomes increasingly divorced from an analysis of a stock’s
underlying fundamentals and based more upon “heterogeneous expectations about
price movements.”151 Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine has
commented that “actively traded funds turn over at a rate which makes it difficult to
believe that their managers are basing their decisions on a genuine assessment of the
corporations’ long-term cash flow prospects as opposed to their speculation about
where the market is heading.”152 It has been empirically shown that increases in
stock ownership by shorter-horizon investors are associated with reductions in
longer-term investment spending and increased short-term earnings.153 These cuts to
spending, like reductions in research and development, lead to short-term increases
in stock valuations that eventually decrease over time.154
John Coffee details how in 2017, the hedge fund Elliot Management bought
large stakes in NRG Energy, the second-largest producer of electricity in the U.S.,
in order to force sales of recently purchased solar and wind-based assets.155 As part
of its push to sell-off NRG’s $4 billion renewable energy business, Elliot placed a
former utility regulator on the board who described himself as “battling this global
warming hoax for [six] years now.”156 NRG’s stock soared after the shake-up, and
just months later, in early 2018, Elliott exited its position, selling 10 million shares
150

Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Hedge Fund Investor Activism and Takeovers
13 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 08-004, 2007),
https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/08-004.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA9S-EN33].
151
Dallas, supra note 22, at 300; see also Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of ShortTerm Performance Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65, 66 (2005) (“The shorter the holding
period, the more the beliefs of others rather than long-term fundamentals become central to
investment decisions. High turnover thus sets the stage for short-term earnings-based
decision making or momentum-motivated trading, which is not at all concerned with
earnings.”).
152
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 478
(2014).
153
Martijn Cremers, Ankur Pareek & Zacharias Sautner, Short-Term Investors, LongTerm Investments, and Firm Value: Evidence from Russell 2000 Index Inclusions, 66 MGMT.
SCI. 4535, 4535 (2020).
154
Id.; see also Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Executive
Compensation and Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD.
577, 598 (2006).
155
John C. Coffee Jr., The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted
Majorities, and the Public Morality 36–37 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
373, 2017), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2057 [https://perma.
cc/BA38-PBBB].
156
Ed Crooks, Activists Clash over Direction for NRG Energy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2017), https://ft.com/content/89417ba2-1d3e-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9 [https://perma.cc/
H39Y-CPK8].
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of NRG, and pocketing more than a 100% return.157 How less energy-diversified
NRG will fare in the coming years, only time will tell, but this story is consistent
with a market that undervalues climate-risk resilient assets. From the perspective of
the hedge fund, it makes sense to force a company to sell assets that the market
undervalues in the short term. But with carbon regulation increasingly inevitable,
the sale may end up damaging NRG’s long-term prospects.
The lack of demand for long-term risk analysis may be exacerbated by the rise
of passive investment strategies, like indexing and exchange traded funds (ETFs).158
At present, around half of U.S. stock held in investment funds is passively
managed.159 Passive investment means that the fund commits to matching and
maintaining its portfolio to meet a certain stock index.160 Because index funds “buy
and hold” sections of the market, they have little need for expensive equity analyst
recommendations on whether to buy or sell. Indexing has grown rapidly over the
years, with hundreds of millions of dollars exiting active funds and entering passive

157

FINTEL, Elliott Management Corporation Ownership in NRG / NRG Energy Inc
(May 15, 2018), https://fintel.io/so/us/nrg/elliott-management [https://perma.cc/5SN84NT8]; Carleton English, What Activist Elliott Management Looks for in a Utility Stock—
and How Investors Can Take Advantage, BARRON’S (July 3, 2020), https://www.barrons.co
m/articles/beaten-down-utility-stocks-could-power-up-51593710476 [https://perma.cc/4Q4
P-TJAD]; see also YAHOO! FINANCE, NRG Energy, Inc., https://yhoo.it/3lz4SMz
[https://perma.cc/L9Z5-54AQ] (showing that the price of NRG stock on the day Elliott
obtained its shares—January 17, 2017—was between 16.11 and 16.45, and that the price of
NRG stock on the day Elliott sold its 10 million shares—May 15, 2018—was between 33.71
and 33.98).
158
This concern that the rise of indexing has drowned out the market drivers of supply
and demand that are crucial for accurately pricing a stock has been expressed elsewhere, with
varying degrees of hysteria. See Inigo Fraser-Jenkins, Paul Gait, Alla Harmsworth, Mark
Diver, Sarah McCarthy, Robertas Stancikas, Alix Guerrini, Jonathan Absolon, Marion de
Floris & Maureen Hughes, The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing Is Worse than
Marxism, SANFORD C. BERNSTEIN & CO., LLC (Aug. 23, 2016) (warning that passive
investing eliminates the mechanism which “optimize[s] the flows of capital in the real
economy”); Jonathan Brogaard, Matthew Ringgenberg & David Sovich, The Economic
Impact of Index Investing, 32 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 3461 (2019) (concluding from an empirical
study of the impact of index investing on commodity price signals that “[c]onsistent with a
feedback channel in which market participants learn from prices, our results suggest that
index investing distorts the price signal thereby generating a negative externality that
impedes firms’ ability to make production decisions”); Eric Belasco, Michael Finke & David
Nanigian, The Impact of Passive Investing on Corporate Valuation, 38 MANAGERIAL FIN.
1067, 1080 (2011) (concluding from an empirical study that “the preference shift towards
index fund investing is reducing the informational efficiency of stock prices”).
159
John Detrixhe, Half of US Stock Fund Assets Are Now Invested in Index Funds,
QUARTZ (May 20, 2019), https://qz.com/1623418/index-funds-now-account-for-half-the-usstock-market/ [https://perma.cc/7HKN-4Z64].
160
See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment
Law, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 1 (1976).
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funds.161 As consumer demand for actively managed funds declines, so does the
budget for equity research.162 The number of equity analysts employed by
investment funds has steadily declined in recent years,163 with the twelve largest
investment banks employing 25% fewer analysts in 2019 as compared to 2011.164
One report quoted an analyst as saying their “biggest and fastest growing client base
is the hedge fund industry, which pushes analysts to be short-term.”165
Index funds, unlike the buyers and sellers in an active market, are constrained
by their investment strategy. They cannot sell out of a stock they believe is grossly
overvalued. One index fund manager, in explaining his worry that the market
misprices climate risk, acknowledges that his firm’s indexing strategy prevents the
use of exit, which would otherwise drive down the price of an overinflated stock:
“It’s of paramount importance to us that the market is able to reflect risk and
opportunity in stock prices, particularly for our index funds, which don’t get to select
the stocks they own.”166 But if long-term investors think climate risks are

161

One investment research company dubbed the phenomenon “flowmageddon.”
Russel
Kinnel,
It’s
Flowmageddon!,
MORNINGSTAR
(Apr.
7,
2016),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/747879/its-flowmageddon [https://perma.cc/XK7QVKW7].
162
Robin Wigglesworth, Final Call for the Research Analyst?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/85ee225a-ec4e-11e6-930f-061b01e23655
[https://perma.cc/4KQ8-2MZ7] (charting the decline in the number of total equity analysts
employed, and attributing it, in part, to the competitive pressure from passive funds).
163
Sarah Gordon, Sellside Research Would Be Little Missed, FIN. TIMES, (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/0609b1b4-ec51-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6 [https://perma.cc/V
S6Y-DP7V] (referring to sellside analysts as “a dying breed”).
164
Robin Wigglesworth & Philip Stafford, Analyst Coverage Shrinks After Fee ShakeUp, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/a85848e0-1507-11ea-9ee411f260415385 [https://perma.cc/B8ML-VHRH]; see also Justina Lee, Analyst Jobs Vanish
as a Perfect Storm Crashes into Research, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2019-12-19/analyst-jobs-vanish-as-a-perfect-storm-hits-wall-streetresearch [https://perma.cc/7U76-DF6C] (reporting that spending on buy side research has
fallen between 20% to 30%, and is likely to fall that much again in the near future, in part
because “[m]achines are doing a lot more of the work and investors are piling into passive
funds,” but also due to EU MiFID II regulations that require research costs to be separated
from trading fees in client billing, forcing banks to directly justify the cost of research).
165
NAQVI ET AL., supra note 22, at 59 (“The highest volume customers of sell-side
equity research are hedge funds. This prevents a stronger focus on long-term risks.”).
166
F. William McNabb III & Glenn Booraem, Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual
Report, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/09/18/investment-stewardship-2017-annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/KD
4Y-FCQG]; see also Examining the Macroeconomic Impacts of a Changing Climate:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev. and Monetary Pol’y, 116th Cong.48
(2019) (referencing testimony of Alicia Seiger, Managing Dir., Stanford Sustainable Fin.
Initiative, stating that passive investors are exposed to systemic mispriced climate risks when
active traders fail to trade on foreseeable climate risk information).
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“substantially more financially material than do other investors,”167 how are they to
convince shorter-term traders to incorporate these risks into their trading strategy?
One way might be to simply calculate and then publicly release information on
climate-risk mispricing in the hope that the market responds. One of the first (and
still best) studies of physical risk mispricing was produced by asset manager
BlackRock.168 While this public position on market risk from a sophisticated
institution likely had some influence on price at some timescale, it’s a clumsy
mechanism that cannot be relied upon as a substitute for active trading.
Some corporate observers caution that short-term trading based on market
volatility, rather than fundamental financial analysis, will lead to “herding effects,”
in which individual investors make under-informed trades based on market
responses to limited information, such as earnings reports.169 This follow-the-leader
game of stock valuation leads to distortions away from efficient pricing. Index
investing is, in some sense, the ultimate herd. Recent studies provide some evidence
that the growth of passive investing does in fact increase the potential for correlated
market effects, but much more research on the issue is needed.170
Concerns that the rapid rise of indexing will lead to inefficient markets are
typically dismissed with the explanation that the remaining active funds will engage

167

Philipp Kruger, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, The Importance of Climate
Risks for Institutional Investors 19 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 18-58, 2019).
168
See BLACKROCK, GETTING PHYSICAL, supra note 47.
169
Scott Russell, Regulation Fair Disclosure: The Death of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis and the Birth of Herd Behavior, 82 B.U. L. REV. 527, 528 (2002); Dallas, supra
note 22, at 315 (“Markets also absorb less diverse information when unsophisticated
investors rely on certain public information, such as quarterly earnings, and the sophisticated
investors follow this uninformed herd.”).
170
Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, Address at the
London Business School: The Age of Asset Management? (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech723.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HWE-W9Q7]; Enrica Bolognesi & Andrea Zuccheri, On the Efficiency of
Benchmarks Composition: A Behavioural Perspective ITALIAN ASS’N OF SCHOLARS OF
ECON. AND MGMT. OF FIN. INST. AND MKT. (2008); Doron Israeli, Charles M. C. Lee & Suhas
A. Sridharan, Is There a Dark Side to Exchange Traded Funds? An Information Perspective,
22 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1048, 1078 (2017) (presenting empirical analyses which support the
conclusion that increased ETF ownership leads to less analyst coverage of underlying
securities and a decrease in firm-specific information being integrated into stock prices); see
also Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC-NYU Dialogue on
Exchange-Traded Products (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speechpiwowar-2017-09-08 [https://perma.cc/5LH3-4UWL] (describing the evidence on whether
passive investing leads to reduced market efficiency as “mixed”); cf. Lawrence Glosten,
Suresh Nallareddy & Yuan Zou, ETF Activity and Informational Efficiency of Underlying
Securities, 67 MGMT. SCI. 22, 44 (2021) (“ETF activity can improve short-run informational
efficiency for underlying stocks.”).
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in trading that will result in the accurate pricing of equity.171 However, these active
funds typically have a shorter holding period and investment horizon than index
funds and are interested in short-term rather than long-term profits.172 BlackRock
responds to allegations that its ETFs distort efficient stock pricing by pointing out
that there is an “extremely diverse” set of indexes: ones with “a broad market focus,
others with a geographic focus, and still others with a sector-specific focus.”173 The
company argues that their investor-customers make the decision as to which index
best suits their needs.174 The implication is that this asset allocation decision itself
affects price efficiency, as it reflects investor demand. A counter-response to this
defense is that price efficiency is about individual stocks, not baskets of stocks. Or,
if we take BlackRock’s argument that index selection is just another form of active
management—impacting price efficiency—then perhaps index providers should be
regulated as financial advisors.175
Further, the increasing flow of money into ESG investment products ($20
billion in 2019 alone)176 suggests that investors are waking up to climate-related
risks and potential mispricing. But the main vehicle for ESG investing tends to be
“passive” funds that track an ESG index whose composition has been determined
by companies’ ESG scores. These ESG metrics and indices have come under fire for
misleading investors as to their methodology and composition.177 Here, the question
arises as to how much of an informed decision an investor is making when allocating
assets to these bundles of stocks. As Adriana Robertson has argued, the investor is,
in a way, delegating asset allocation decisions to the creator of the ESG index.178
This delegation may come with underexplored agency costs and third-party
171

See Myles Udland, The Laziest Investing Argument in the World Gets Blown Up,
BUS. INSIDER (May 2, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/passive-investing-makesmarkets-more-efficient-2016-5 [https://perma.cc/J4BT-FPCP] (summarizing the argument
that index funds make the market more efficient by removing inexperienced investors from
the price-determining mechanisms of supply and demand).
172
Strine, supra note 142, at 1915.
173
BLACKROCK, INDEX INVESTING SUPPORTS VIBRANT CAPITAL MARKETS 14 (2017).
174
Id. at 8, 14.
175
Robertson, supra note 24, at 848; Paul G. Mahoney & Adriana Z. Robertson,
Advisers by Another Name, U. VA. SCH. L., L. & ECON. PAPER SERIES 2021-01 (2021); see
also Johannes Petry, Jan Fichtner & Eelke Heemskerk, Steering Capital: The Growing
Private Authority of Index Providers in the Age of Passive Asset Management, 28 REV. INT’L
POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2019) (arguing that index providers “steer capital with their indices as
inclusions of firms or countries to an index can lead to inflows of billions of US$ while
exclusions can cause large quasi-automatic outflows”).
176
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 114 (citing Jon Hale, Sustainable Fund Flows in
2019 Smash Previous Records, MORNINGSTAR (Jan 10, 2020)).
177
ESG scores from the main five ESG data providers are uncorrelated for any given
company. Florian Berg, Julian F. Koelbel & Roberto Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The
Divergence of ESG Ratings 31 (MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 5822-19, 2019)
(“ESG rating divergence is not merely driven by differences in opinions, but also by
disagreements about underlying data.”).
178
Robertson, supra note 24, at 848; see also Petry et al., supra note 175, at 20.
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mediation that obscures price efficiency. Vanguard’s ESG US Stock ETF was called
out by the Financial Times for including companies like Kinder Morgan and
Marathon Petroleum, despite claiming to “specifically exclude” fossil fuels.179 One
analysis of funds offered in the UK found that more than one-third of those marketed
as climate or low-carbon focused nevertheless contained oil and gas stocks.180
5. Misinformation and Biases
In order for the market to be efficient under the ECMH, it must incorporate all
publicly available information into share prices.181 But what if the market is broadly
failing to make informed assessments, despite available information? Billionaire
investor Jeremy Grantham has repeatedly argued that the market is failing to
reasonably account for expected climate impacts:
[T]his is the first time in history, I believe, where a significant chunk of
the US investment community does not believe in the most important
factor that will affect [the energy] sector – climate change. Why? Because
we have had a 30-year, well-funded program to make the problem of
climate change seem vague, distant, and problematic. . . . How many
[climate] deniers does it take to distort the price? How can this not affect
the market’s probabilities of carbon taxes, energy regulations, and other
important factors?182
Over the last few decades, fossil-fuel companies, related industries, and their
allies have gone to great lengths to spread misinformation and doubt about the
existence and impacts of climate change.183 The American Petroleum Institute has
179

Rennison & Nauman, supra note 24.
Adrienne Buller, ‘Doing Well by Doing Good’? Examining the Rise of ESG
Investing, COMMON-WEALTH 23–24 (Dec. 12, 2020), https://www.common-wealth.co.uk/
reports/doing-well-by-doing-good-examining-the-rise-of-environmental-social-governance
-esg-investing [https://perma.cc/555W-JNYM].
181
When Eugene Fama first introduced his influential hypothesis, he divided the
ECMH into three versions: the “weak,” “semi-strong,” and “strong” forms of the hypothesis.
Under the strong form, prices reflect all relevant public and non-public information; under
the semi-strong form, prices reflect all relevant public information (meaning insider trading
can reap profits); and under its weak form, the hypothesis holds that price history cannot be
used to predict future price movements. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). See also Gilson & Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, infra note 213, at 554–56, and Gilson & Kraakman,
Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis, supra note 16.
182
JEREMY GRANTHAM, GMO, THE RACE OF OUR LIVES REVISITED 32–33 (2018),
https://www.gmo.com/americas/research-library/the-race-of-our-lives-revisited/ [https://per
ma.cc/38VT-G9LC].
183
See generally ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 25; MEYER, supra note 25.
Academic economists have played a role in downplaying the severity of the climate crisis.
180

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675

96

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

been funding climate disinformation and opposition for decades, including currently
through social media.184 The Trump administration aided in this disinformation
campaign when federal agency websites were overhauled to remove the term
“climate change,” deleting whole documents and webpages on the issue.185 The head
of the Environmental Protection Agency said in a 2017 CNBC interview that he does
not believe carbon dioxide to be a “primary contributor” to global warming.186
These efforts have had a well-documented influence on public opinion.187
While an increasing percentage of the population now agrees that climate change is
occurring—primarily because of their direct observations of extreme weather—the
public’s understanding of its causes and effects is poor.188 In a 2018 survey in
Germany, only 31% of respondents correctly answered “no” to the question of
whether ocean evaporation due to higher temperatures was predicted to lead to

See Spencer Glendon, A Price, but at What Cost?, WOODWELL CLIMATE RSCH. CTR. (Feb.
18, 2019), https://www.woodwellclimate.org/a-price-but-at-what-cost/ [https://perma.cc/XT
Y4-XRYD] (quoting William Nordhaus as stating that the difference between a climate and
no-climate scenario is so small you “can barely spot the difference” on a growth chart); see
also THOMAS SCHELLING, COSTS & BENEFITS OF GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION 19 (1998)
(“I am not disappointed that no one is making progress on reducing emissions now because
I think that within the next twenty years, we will have a better understanding of the effects
of carbon emissions on the global climate.”).
184
See generally Benjamin Franta, Early Oil Industry Disinformation on Global
Warming, 30 ENV’T POL’Y 663 (2021) (finding that “the American Petroleum Institute was
promulgating false and misleading information about climate change in 1980, nearly a
decade earlier than previously known”); Emma Newburger, Democrats Call on Oil
Companies to Testify on Climate Disinformation, CNBC (Sept. 16, 2021, 2:54 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/16/democrats-to-investigate-oil-companies-over-climatedisinformation.html [https://perma.cc/HV96-STUZ]; Hiroko Tabuchi, In Your Facebook
Feed: Oil Industry Pushback Against Biden Climate Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/30/climate/api-exxon-biden-climate-bill.html [https://
perma.cc/AJC6-6GRC].
185
ENV’T DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, CHANGING THE DIGITAL CLIMATE: HOW
CLIMATE CHANGE WEB CONTENT IS BEING CENSORED UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
25–26 (2018).
186
Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruittglobal-warming.html [https://perma.cc/G64Z-K6U5].
187
See, e.g., Phoebe Keane, How the Oil Industry Made Us Doubt Climate Change,
BBC
NEWS
(Sept.
20,
2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-53640382
[https://perma.cc/TVN9-PFVV].
188
Robinson Meyer, The Unprecedented Surge in Fear About Climate Change, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/01/do-mostamericans-believe-climate-change-polls-say-yes/580957/ [https://perma.cc/3BR5-5A9Y].
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declines in global sea level.189 Fifty-one percent thought that the ozone hole is the
main cause of the greenhouse effect.190
A recent survey asked 439 institutional investors about their assessment of
climate related risks.191 Forty percent of the respondents indicated that they expected
more than 2°C of warming by the end of the century, and just 12% expected an
increase of more than 3°C. This means 60% of institutional investors believe
warming will stay below 2°C despite the evidence that even if all countries were to
fully meet their emissions targets and pledges under the Paris Agreement, warming
by 2100 would likely reach 2.4°C.192 Their beliefs are misaligned not only with
scientific projections, but also with their own portfolio allocations, most of which
hold fossil assets that, if correctly valued, are aligned with a world headed to at least
3°C.193
CEOs of American companies are disproportionately old, white, male, and
conservative compared to the general population.194 So are their boards.195
Numerous studies have shown that this demographic is especially likely to deny the
existence of climate change, or to downplay its effects.196 In a 2018 poll, only 18%
189

Monika Taddicken, Anne Reif & Imke Hoppe, What Do People Know About
Climate Change ― and How Confident are They? On Measurements and Analyses of
Science Related Knowledge, 17 J. SCI. COMMC’N 1, 11–12 (2018).
190
Id. at 13.
191
See Philipp Kruger, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, The Importance of Climate
Risks for Institutional Investors 27–28 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 18-58, 2019).
192
Temperatures: Addressing Global Warming, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER,
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/ [https://perma.cc/MU8W-BNUS] (last
updated May 2021).
193
Alastair Marsh, ‘Portfolio Warming’ Is the New Climate Anxiety for Fund
Managers, BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/202102-23/climate-change-s-impact-on-portfolios-is-axa-s-mega-investors-new-anxiety [https://
perma.cc/UZ3J-AERC].
194
Jeff Green, Jordyn Holman & Janet Paskin, America’s C-Suites Keep Getting Whiter
(and More Male, Too), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-09-21/america-s-c-suites-keep-getting-whiter-and-more-male-too [https://per
ma.cc/YN94-N7VP]; Claire Zillman, The Fortune 500 Has More Female CEOs than Ever
Before, FORTUNE (May 16, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/05/16/fortune-500female-ceos/ [https://perma.cc/2MYL-CZB5] (stating that as of June 2019, just 33 of the
Fortune 500 CEOs were women, and women comprised only 25% of Fortune 500 boards).
195
Alma Cohen, Moshe Hazan, Roberto Tallarita & David Weiss, The Politics of CEOs,
11 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 450, 2019) (“We
find that more than 57 percent of CEOs are Republicans (so defined), 19 percent are
Democrats (so defined), and the rest are Neutral (so defined) . . . . Furthermore, Republican
CEOs lead companies with almost twice the asset value of companies led by Democratic
CEOs.”).
196
Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Cool Dudes: The Denial of Climate Shange
Among Conservative White Males in the United States, 21 GLOB. ENVT’L CHANGE 1–2
(2011) (summarizing literature “finding that self-identified liberals, non-whites, and females
are more likely to express concern about global warming than are their conservative, white,
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of Republicans in the baby boomer generation and older believed that the earth was
warming due to human activity.197 Sitting board members and executives of major
financial institutions have come under fire for their record as climate deniers.198
Even when market actors have access to valid information concerning climate
risks, their risk-assessment judgment is still tempered by persistent cognitive biases.
Climate change, a long-term process not easily discernable in our daily lives, poses
a challenge to accurate human threat assessment for a number of reasons.
Psychological research has demonstrated that humans suffer from a status quo bias,
whereby we not only prefer current conditions but also irrationally assume they will

and male counterparts, respectively”); see also PWC, THE COLLEGIALITY CONUNDRUM:
FINDING BALANCE IN THE BOARDROOM 19, 26 (2019) (finding that “64% of female directors
think investors are giving environmental/sustainability issues the right amount of attention,
compared to just 33% of male directors,” and that 50% of all directors indicated that
environmental expertise was either “not very important” or “not at all important” to include
in a board’s competencies—it was ranked the least important out of 13 categories of
expertise).
197
Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the
Environment in 7 Charts, PEW RSCH. CNTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/04/21/how-americans-see-climate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts/
[https://perma.cc/RA43-DX4F].
198
Saijel Kishan, Climate Skeptic Asset Managers Face Pressure to Reveal Donations,
BLOOMBERG GREEN (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0214/climate-skeptic-asset-managers-face-pressure-to-reveal-donations [https://perma.cc/NX
5D-RVTZ] (discussing investment chief of Harris Associates previous denials of the
existence of global warming); Environmental Groups Call for JPMorgan Chase to Drop
Climate Denier Lee Raymond From Board, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://foe.org/news/environmental-groups-call-jpmorgan-chase-drop-climate-denier-leeraymond-board/ [https://perma.cc/6QPF-ANBA] (discussing the request by environmental
groups to JP Morgan to remove ExxonMobil CEO from the bank’s board of directors).
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continue.199 This bias may influence shareholders to undervalue the significance of
climate risk.200
The rational assessment of climate risk is further muddled by the very nature of
information about climate change. Behavioral psychology tells us that information
that is complicated and “difficult to decipher” is more likely to be discarded as
untrue.201 Market actors suffer from a number of heuristics, or mental shortcuts,
which can derail the rational processing of complicated information. First, the
availability heuristic may cause people to excessively discount the possibility of
“black swan” climate events unless they’ve recently encountered salient examples
of such events.202 But, by definition, these high-impact, low-probability events are
unlikely to occur frequently. Investors and managers, failing to find examples of

199

The status quo bias has been experimentally demonstrated many times. See, e.g.,
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197–98 (1991) (discussing
experiments demonstrating status quo bias); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser,
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (finding through a
series of decision-making experiments that individuals disproportionately stick with the
status quo). However, some have more recently argued that status quo bias can be rational in
some circumstances. See, e.g., Jacob M. Nebel, Status Quo Bias, Rationality, and
Conservatism about Value, 125 ETHICS 449, 475 (2015) (finding status quo bias may be
rational under the conservative principle to “preserve valuable things”); Scott Eidelman &
Christian S. Crandall, Bias in Favor of the Status Quo, 6 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH.
COMPASS 270, 270–71 (2012) (finding some cognitive and informational limitations may
rationally justify continuation of the status quo).
200
Katie Critchlow, Irrational Apathy: Investigating Behavioural Economic
Explanations for the Carbon Bubble (2016) (Masters dissertation, London School of
Economics Dissertation), https://www.academia.edu/16319184/Investigating_behavioural_
biases_and_the_carbon_bubble [https://perma.cc/YF33-J35Y]; see generally Elke U.
Weber, What Shapes Perceptions of Climate Change?, 1 WILEY INTERDISC. REVS.: CLIMATE
CHANGE 332, 336 (2010) (discussing possible reasons behind the low levels of concern
among Americans toward climate change as an immediate risk).
201
ADAM SZYSZKA, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS: HOW
PSYCHOLOGY INFLUENCES INVESTORS AND CORPORATIONS (2013) (citing Rolf Reber &
Norbert Schwarz, Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth, 8 CONSCIOUSNESS
& COGNITION 338 (1999)); see also Stephan Lewandowsky, Ulrich K. H. Ecker, Colleen M.
Seifert, Norbert Schwarz & John Cook, Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued
Influence and Successful Debiasing, 13 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 106, 117 (2012) (finding
people often prefer simpler rather than complex explanations and that “[w]hen
misinformation is corrected with an alternative, but much more complex, explanation, people
may reject it in favor of a simpler account that maintains the misinformation”).
202
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26; see also Thorsten Pachur, Ralph Hertwig & Florian
Steinmann, How Do People Judge Risks: Availability Heuristic, Affect Heuristic, or Both?,
18 J. EXPERIMENTAL PYSCH.: APPLIED 314, 314 (2012) (finding availability heuristic
”conformed to people’s responses best” regarding perception of certain health care risks).
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these events in their everyday lives, may irrationally devalue serious climate risks to
their companies and portfolios.203
Rational decision-making is also stymied by a myopic focus on immediate
rewards irrespective of the long-term consequences of those rewards.204 Market
actors are predisposed to prefer short-term goal gratification regardless of its longterm consequences.205 This “present-bias” also inhibits people from accurately
considering future benefits with upfront costs.206 This bias may be particularly
disastrous in the context of climate change, where adaption may require significant
capital expenditures in the near term in exchange for mitigated losses (or gains
relative to competitors) farther in the future.
Individuals are influenced by the availability heuristic—the tendency to give
greater importance to events that happened recently or that are easier to recall.207 For
this reason, market actors are most likely to imagine a future that looks similar to
the recent past, even if it means ignoring broader scientific understanding.208 Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s Prospect Theory suggests that company executives
may be reluctant to spend upfront capital on climate adaptation measures, even if
those measures save the company money in the long run. Under Prospect Theory’s
certainty effect, individuals put more weight on outcomes that are certain, and less
weight on outcomes that are unlikely, discounting them by more than the rational

203

Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 12; Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic,
Intuitive Cost-benefit Analysis, and Climate Change, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 195–196
(2006) (discussing American attitudes towards regulations in response to climate change as
opposed to European’s “Precautionary Principle”).
204
Lisa Zaval & James F. M. Cornwell, Cognitive Biases, Non-Rational Judgments,
and Public Perceptions of Climate Change, OXFORD RSCH. ENCYCLOPEDIA CLIMATE SCI.
10 (Nov. 2016) (citing George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal
Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 Q. J. ECON. 573 (1992)); see also Natalie L.
Denburg & William M. Hedgcock, Age-Associated Executive Dysfunction, the Prefrontal
Cortex, and Complex Decision Making, in AGING AND DECISION MAKING: EMPIRICAL AND
APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 1, 92 (Thomas M. Hess, JoNell Strough & Corinna E. Löckenhoff
eds., 2015) (reaffirming tendency of “temporal discounting” whereby “individuals tend to
have difficulty delaying gratification and would rather delay negative consequences”).
205
Walter Mischel & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Attention in Delay of Gratification, 16 J.
PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCH. 329 (1970); see also Denburg & Hedgcock, supra note 204, at
92.
206
Zaval & Cornwell, supra note 204, at 10; see also Leonhard K. Lades, Towards an
Incentive Salience Model of Intertemporal Choice, 33 J. ECON. PSYCH. 833 (2012)
(reaffirming finding that “as the future becomes present over time, the individuals’
intertemporal preferences change towards preferring immediate payoffs”).
207
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127–28; see also Pachur et al., supra note 202, at 314.
208
Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 8 (“The availability heuristic may lead people
to discount excessively the possibility of losses from high magnitude but low probability
risks if such a loss has not occurred recently.” (citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 207,
at 1127–28)).
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weighing of their probability of occurrence.209 Thus, managers may overweigh the
costs of adaptation measures in the present, which have a certain, known price tag,
and underweight expected future climate damages whose magnitude and timing is
more uncertain.
Managers may be subject to cognitive biases that encourage them to withhold
stock value-decreasing information. Donald Langevoort argues that, even in the
absence of intentional misrepresentation, managers “may subconsciously perceive
information in a way, if at all possible, that permits them to maintain consistency
with their self-image of efficacy and control, thereby justifying (to themselves and
others) preservation of their positions and status.”210 In the face of great uncertainty
around the future of carbon regulation, managers may disregard future scenarios for
decreased oil demand that are well within the realm of possibility and focus instead
on more favorable predicted pathways.211 The Wall Street Journal reports that an
209

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454 (1981) (arguing that the certainty effect is shown when people
prefer certain outcomes and underweight outcomes that are only probable); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also Mara Mather, Nina Mazar, Marissa A. Gorlick, Nichole
R. Lighthall, Jessica Burgeno, Andrej Schoeke & Dan Ariely, Risk Preferences and Aging:
The “Certainty Effect” in Older Adults’ Decision Making, 27 PSYCH. & AGING 801, 811
(2012) (reaffirming the certainty effect and finding that “older adults seem to weigh certainty
more heavily than younger adults do. This finding suggests that older adults are even more
susceptible to what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) termed the Certainty Effect”). The
certainty effect can contribute to market actors seeking risk when one of their options is a
sure loss (e.g., an upfront capital expenditure or the abandonment of a project).
210
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101, 144 (1997); see also Tom Y. Chang, David H. Solomon & Mark M.
Westerfield, Looking for Someone to Blame: Delegation, Cognitive Dissonance, and the
Disposition Effect, 71 J. FIN. 267, 299 (2016) (finding that “The idea that investors may
change their beliefs or take costly actions to preserve their sense of self-identity may seem
odd in a financial setting, but would not be surprising to many social psychologists”).
211
In 2016, a small group of Exxon shareholders expressed concern that the company
was “eroding shareholder value” through investments in capital projects that would be
unprofitable in “a low carbon demand scenario.” They noted that Exxon’s capital
expenditures had grown “9 percent from 2005 to 2014, coinciding with a 1 percent net
income decline” and that Exxon had cut capital distributions to shareholders (through both
dividends and buybacks) by 25% in the preceding year. ExxonMobil Shareholder
Resolution, Item 10—Increase Capital Distributions (2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/34088/000119312516539460/d14941ddef14a.htm
[https://perma.cc/CLW8WC9D]. Similarly concerned shareholders of Chevron pointed to a Chatham House report
that concluded “the only realistic option” for oil majors is to provide cash to shareholders
and “shrink into the remaining areas of operation . . . where they can earn an acceptable
return.” The report noted that this action “would require a major change in [firms’] corporate
culture.” Natasha Lamb, Letter to Chevron Shareholders to Vote “For” Proposal 9, (May 11,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/000121465916011452/d511161px
14a6g.htm [https://perma.cc/Z7A4-9BP4].
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Exxon geoscientist claims he lost his job after he challenged senior executives by
asking the following during a 2020 employee townhall meeting: “We acknowledge
the need to reduce our emissions, yet they are set to increase by at least 20% over
the next five years . . . . In the end, wouldn’t you agree that this is a problem of
behaviors and leadership?”212
While the ECMH accepts that human traders have irrational biases, these biases
are characterized as random and therefore cancel one another out, “leaving price to
reflect a single, best-informed aggregate forecast.”213 Of course, in the situation
where investor biases are not in fact random, but aligned, they will not cancel-out;
they will aggregate and influence the market price.214
6. Corporate Opposition / Regulatory Capture
Shareholders concerned about climate risk have begun to press for disclosure
directly from companies themselves. Their efforts, however, face opposition from
corporate management, not only directly, but also through industry influence on
government regulators.215
212

Christopher M. Matthews, Exxon Used to Be America’s Most Valuable Company.
What Happened?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-usedto-be-americas-most-valuable-company-what-happened-oil-gas-11600037243 [https://perm
a.cc/7T4U-BF2H].
213
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency] (“Although each trader’s own forecasts are skewed by the unique constraints on
his or her judgment, other traders will have offsetting constraints. As trading proceeds, the
random biases of individual forecasts will cancel one another out, leaving price to reflect a
single, best-informed aggregate forecast.”).
214
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 12 (2000) (“Recall that the second line of defense of the efficiency markets theory
is that the irrational investors, while they may exist, trade randomly, and hence cancel each
other out. . . . The psychological evidence shows precisely that people do not deviate from
rationality randomly, but rather most deviate in the same way.”); see also Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, supra note 213, at 581 (explaining that
unsystematic bias “washes out” over trading).
215
In 2016 the SEC sought guidance on the need for updated rules on environmental
risk disclosure. In the thousands of comments the agency received, investors were generally
in favor of “more extensive and rule-like disclosure” while corporations were opposed.
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed.
Reg 23916-01 (Apr. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240
& 249); Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG
Reporting Reform from the Regulation S-K, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67 (2020). A 2019 report by
PwC found a wide disparity between investor and director concerns related to climate change
risk. In survey responses, 56% of directors indicated they thought institutional investors were
devoting too much attention to environmental issues. This was true even though only 50%
of directors agreed that their board “has a strong understanding of the ESG issues impacting
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In response to growing shareholder support for climate disclosure resolutions,
the National Association for Manufacturers (NAM) funded the formation of the
Main Street Investors Coalition, a group that advocates against the influence of
institutional shareholders and their focus on ESG issues.216 Many fossil fuel
executives, including those of Exxon and Shell, sit on NAM’s board of directors.217
The Coalition’s executive director has argued that shareholder climate risk
disclosure resolutions are motivated by asset managers’ personal “political
objectives” rather than genuine concern for assessing investment risk.218 SEC
Commissioner Hester Pierce has similarly spoken about shareholder advocacy for
heightened environmental disclosures, suggesting such advocacy is motivated by
“public shaming” rather than interest in informed investing.219
The Coalition was a vocal supporter of several Trump-era regulations that have
the net effect of making it harder for investors to reflect climate risk in their asset
allocation decisions.220 Under Trump, the SEC finalized two rules that limit investor
power to press for climate risk disclosure from companies: one that limits the ability
of investors to propose and re-propose shareholder resolutions;221 and another that
increases issuer power relative to proxy advisory firms that counsel institutional

their company” and only 34% said that “ESG is regularly a part of the board’s agenda.” The
Collegiality Conundrum: Finding Balance in the Boardroom, PWC’S 2019 ANNUAL
CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY at 4, 20, http://www.circulodedirectores.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/pwc-2019-annual-corporate-directors-survey-full-report-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSY8-K2TA].
216
Andrew Ross Sorkin, What’s Behind a Pitch for the Little-Guy Investor? Big Money
Interests, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/24/business/deal
book/main-street-investors-coalition.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/EL87YYT5].
217
Susan Moran, Most Oil Giants Still Fighting Shareholder Pressure to Address
Climate, THE CLIMATE DOCKET (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.climatedocket.com/2019/04/
11/most-oil-giants-still-fighting-shareholder-pressure-to-address-climate/ [https://perma.cc/
YZ78-LKPQ].
218
George David Banks, Opinion, Environmental Shareholder Resolutions Will Never
Deliver the Climate Consensus that America Needs, WASH. EXAM’R (June 13, 2018),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/environmental-shareholder-resolutio
ns-will-never-deliver-the-climate-consensus-that-america-needs [https://perma.cc/E67Y9LWG].
219
Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before the American
Enterprise Institute (June 18, 2019).
220
Jon Hale, Sustainability Matters: New SEC Rule Weakens Influence of Main Street
Investors, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1002322/
sustainability-matters-new-sec-rule-weakens-influence-of-main-street-investors [https://per
ma.cc/R5XW-D7QL].
221
Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal
Rule (Sept. 23, 2020).
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investors on shareholder votes.222 In addition, the Department of Labor amended
regulations under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act to require that
retirement plan fiduciaries exclusively consider “financial factors” relevant to the
economic value of an investment.223 And the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency finalized a rule prohibiting large banks from excluding categories of
industries, like fossil fuels, from their loan business.224 Outside of official
rulemaking, the SEC granted an unprecedented amount of company requests to
exclude shareholder proposals related to climate change from the proxy process,
meaning they never went to a vote.225
C. Market Failure
While a growing number of investors argue that climate risks remain mispriced,
they cannot correct the mispricing on their own. Informed investors are limited in
their ability to arbitrage away mispricings, particularly those that are widespread and
for which the timing of market correction is difficult to predict.226 While investors
have made some progress in getting corporations to disclose climate-related risks
under voluntary frameworks, these frameworks are insufficient as they provide

222

See Press Release, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, SEC, Paying More for Less: Higher
Costs for Shareholders, Less Accountability for Management (July 22, 2020) (arguing that
the rule will lead to “less accountability on climate risk”); see also Press Release, Robert J.
Jackson Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder Voting (Nov. 5,
2019) (voting against the proposals and warning that this limiting of shareholder influence
“makes it easier for insiders to run public companies in a way that favors their own private
interests over those of ordinary investors”).
223
29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2550 (2020); Press Release, Ceres, Ignoring Overwhelming
Opposition, Labor Department adopts new rule that will impair ESG investing (Oct. 30,
2020) (discussing how an earlier version of the rule proposed directly prohibited the
consideration of ESG factors).
224
Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,261 (Nov. 25, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 55); Eric Rosenbaum, Trump Bank Regulator’s New Rule Incurs
Wall Street and Climate Investor Ire on His Way Out the Door, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/14/trump-bank-regulator-incurs-wall-street-ire-on-way-out
-the-door-.html [https://perma.cc/93BT-ZEYW].
225
McDonnell et al., supra note 28, at 8 (citing Majority Action, Climate Change in the
Boardroom: How Asset Manager Voting Shaped Corporate Climate Action in 2019,
https://www.majorityaction.us/asset-manager-report
[https://perma.cc/M6U3-MURY]);
Steven Mufson, Exxon Shareholders Want Action on Climate Change. The SEC Calls It
Micromanagement., WASH. POST (May 8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national
/health-science/exxon-shareholders-want-action-on-climate-change-sec-calls-it-micromana
gement/2019/05/08/de283bf4-6c49-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html [https://perma.cc
/C6DV-LGTT].
226
See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis, supra
note 16, at 373 (“Prices in markets without an effective arbitrage mechanism incorporate
public information very slowly.”).
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broad discretion to issuers and little assurance as to the accuracy of the information
provided.
1. Inability of the Market to Self-Correct
If there is in fact systemic and irrational investor bias, the ECMH posits that
rationally informed arbitrageurs will exploit the mispricing, reaping a profit while
bringing prices back to fundamental values.227 However, practical limits to arbitrage
in the real world mean that the knowledge that asset valuations ignore climate risks
does not necessarily enable an investor to make a profitable trade on that
information, particularly without knowledge of when these risks will be exposed and
repriced.
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is the most widely used model for
calculating the equilibrium price of stocks. It assumes that all investors have access
to the same publicly available information and that all investors have homogeneous
expectations about future valuations. In the real market, however, investors have
access to different amounts of information and may form different forecasts about
the future.228 When shareholders harbor increasingly heterogeneous expectations
about the future, “one would expect increasingly inefficient prices, at least as judged
by the yardstick of the CAPM.”229 Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter have explained
that heterogeneity in shareholder expectations is more likely to occur in situations
when shareholders face uncertainty in predicting the future, such as “when there is
a change in technology, when glamour companies emerge, or when companies
running newer businesses with less established track records become an important
part of the market.”230 Climate change presents a similar shift in the status quo that
impedes reliable forecasting.
Even if some groups of shareholders are informed, the speculative aspect of
stock price fluctuations might lead them to hold on to their stock rather than sell,
knowing that climate skeptics and backward-facing algorithms are going to maintain
demand in the immediate future. A well-informed investor may suspect, or even
know, that a stock is overvalued and deviating from the true value diminished by
climate risk, but she may nevertheless be powerless to influence the trends of the
market.231
227

See SHLEIFER, supra note 214, at 4; Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, supra note 213, at 581.
228
Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, supra note 213, at 577.
229
Id. at 561–62 n.41 (citing Stephen Figlewski, Information Diversity and Market
Behavior, 37 J. FIN. 87, 101 (1982) (“heterogeneous expectations as obstacles to short and
long run equilibrium prices”)); see also Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and
Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1153–54 (1977) (noting badly informed investors
tend to overprice risky assets).
230
Bratton & Watcher, supra note 118, at 707.
231
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 197 (3d ed. 2015) (“[I]f indeed one
knew today that the market would do poorly over the next ten or twenty years, but did not
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Why aren’t savvy investors shorting stocks misvalued due to climate risk? And
shouldn’t this shorting mechanism itself move prices closer to fundamental value?
Some investors are in fact banking on the mispricing. David Burt, profiled in
Michael Lewis’s book The Big Short, is known for having predicted the 2008
subprime crisis and helping Cornwall Capital make millions of dollars through
shorting the market.232 He has recently appeared in headlines again, this time for
heading an investment firm whose strategy is betting against residential mortgagebacked securities with exposure to coastal regions at risk from extreme weather
events.233
But beyond these asset-specific shorting strategies, a large literature on the
“limits to arbitrage” details why informed arbitrageurs are very limited in their
ability to correct broad market mispricings.234 Arbitrageurs can’t short the whole
market, and they lack the resources to correct market-, or even industry-wide
bubbles.235 Mere knowledge that the market is out of step with reality and behaving
like a bubble is not enough—a trader must also have some ability to predict just
know exactly when it would begin to do poorly and could not prove one’s knowledge to a
broad audience, then there would be no way to profit significantly from this knowledge.”).
232
Geoff Dembicki, A ‘Big Short’ Investor’s New Bet: Climate Change Will Bust the
Housing Market, VICE (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.vice.com/en/article/wjwyy9/a-bigshort-investors-new-bet-climate-change-will-bust-the-housing-market [https://perma.cc/Q4
EQ-5BZN].
233
Kate Duguid, Citing Climate Risk, Investors Bet Against Mortgage Market,
REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2019) (quoting David Burt, “The market’s failure to integrate climate
science with investment analysis has created a mispricing phenomenon that is possibly larger
than the mortgage credit bubble of the mid-2000s”); Diana Olick, Former Subprime Player
Claims He Can Now Short the Mortgage Market for Climate and Covid Risks, CNBC (Nov.
23, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/23/shorting-mortgage-market-covid-19-climaterisks.html [https://perma.cc/37ZM-AQL9].
234
See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175,
208– 13 (2010) (summarizing the literature).
235
See SHLEIFER, supra note 214, at 13–14
An arbitrageur who thinks that stocks as a whole are overpriced cannot sell short
stocks and buy a substitute portfolio, since such a portfolio does not exist. The
arbitrageur can instead simply sell or reduce exposure to stocks in the hope of an
above-market return, but this arbitrage is no longer even approximately riskless,
especially since the average expected return on stocks is high and positive. If the
arbitrageur is risk averse, his interest in such arbitrage will be limited. With a
finite risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs as a group, their aggregate ability to
bring prices of broad groups of securities into line is limited as well.
Of course, when we get into the realm of quasi-arbitrage, where the relative prices
of broad groups of securities seem to be out of whack, the risks become even more
substantial. . . . As long as arbitrageurs have short horizons and so must worry
about liquidating their investment in a mispriced asset, their aggressiveness will
be limited even in the absence of a fundamental risk. Id. at 51.
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when the market will come to its senses and the bubble will burst.236 Without this,
they will be left holding a short position that requires substantial funds to hold, funds
that their clients are uncomfortable, or incapable of, holding over long periods of
time.237
2. Moral Hazard
Even if markets—that is, managers of financial institutions—could correct the
mispricing, their own motivation to do so may be muted by expectations of
government bailout. As argued by Graham Steele, banks and other institutions may
fail to price in climate-related tail-risks for precisely this reason: that in the event of
catastrophic loss, they expect the government to provide funds rather than letting a
systemically important financial institution fail.238 This moral hazard may limit the
motivations of market actors to fully account for catastrophic climate risks.239 Bank
executives’ lack of incentive to “self-insure”240 against climate risks is arguably even
more acute than their non-financial CEO peers.241
3. Failures of Voluntary Disclosure Standards
Shareholders, especially institutional investors, have woken up to the likely
mispricing of climate risk in recent years.242 And they have begun to demand the
information they need for risk assessment via voluntary disclosures, through open
letters to CEOs and votes in favor of disclosure proxy proposals.243 The private
236

Schwartz, supra note 234, at 213; Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory
to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 9697 (2003); SHLIEFER, supra note 214, at
156–74.
237
SHLIEFER, supra note 214, at 182.
238
Graham Steele, Confronting the “Climate Lehman Moment”: The Case for
Macroprudential Climate Regulation, 30 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 137–40 (2020).
Steele also points out that the six largest U.S. banks are responsible for 37% of global fossil
fuel financing since the signing of the Paris Agreement. Id. at 117 n.34.
239
BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 9 (referring to potential for central banks to become
“climate rescuers of last resort”).
240
21st Century Economy: Protecting the Financial System from Risks Associated with
Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urb. Affs., 117th Cong.
14 (2021) (statement of Greg Gelzinis, Associate Director of Economic Policy for Center for
American Progress).
241
Cf. Section II.B.3, supra note 20.
242
BLACKROCK, GETTING PHYSICAL, supra note 47.
243
See, e.g., David Vetter, Wielding $9 Trillion, Investors Warn Firms from BP to BMW
to Get Real on Climate Change, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2020 4:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/davidrvetter/2020/11/16/wielding-9-trillion-investors-warn-firms-from-bp-to-bmw-to
-get-real-on-climate-change/?sh=1e931ee37ea0 [https://perma.cc/8ALY-PRBK]; Jackie
Cook & Tom Lauricella, How Big Fund Families Voted on Climate Change: 2020 Edition,
MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1002749/how-big-
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sector has come to something of a consensus around the default standard for a
voluntary disclosure regime: the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosure (TCFD)
produced a reporting framework in 2017 that is meant to be “widely adoptable” and
“applicable to organizations across all sectors and jurisdictions.”244 The framework
recommends eleven categories of disclosure, organized under four core elements
covering governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.245 Some
investors and experts have pushed for companies to report against industry-specific
standards in addition to their TCFD disclosures.246
Voluntary reporting frameworks, however, are an imperfect solution to the
problem of inadequate climate risk disclosures. Without enforcement and
standardization, companies can pick and choose which reporting frameworks, or
categories of risk within those frameworks, they disclose. This is particularly evident
in the voluntary disclosure of fossil fuel companies to CDP, who report “more
opportunities than risks from climate change.”247 As of 2018, the average voluntarily
complying company provided less than four of the eleven disclosure metrics
recommended under the TCFD.248 Firms have been particularly slow to employ
scenario analysis and discuss climate-related operational risk—just 9% discussed
the resilience of their business models to climate change.249 And disclosures are far
more likely to dwell on transition risks than discuss physical risks.250 These
voluntary disclosures remain nonstandardized and are difficult for stakeholders to
analyze and compare across companies.251 A large number of companies simply do
not report climate risks through voluntary frameworks or otherwise. One third of
fund-families-voted-on-climate-change-2020-edition
[https://perma.cc/4YLB-2GDC]
(showing average shareholder support for climate-risk disclosure requests climbed to an alltime high in 2020); VANGUARD GROUP, CLIMATE RISK GOVERNANCE: WHAT VANGUARD
EXPECTS OF COMPANIES AND THEIR BOARDS (2020).
244
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
iii (2017). The TCFD’s 2020 Status Report found that 1,344 corporations globally have
expressed support for its recommendations, including 219 U.S. companies. See TASK FORCE
ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, 2020 STATUS REPORT 68 (2020). Financial
institutions managing $150 trillion have also stated support for the TCFD. Id.
245
Id. at 10.
246
See SASB Standards, SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
https://www.sasb.org/standards/download/ [https://perma.cc/8BKF-GJJM] (last visited Aug.
8, 2021).
247
CDP, supra note 83, at 7.
248
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, 2019 STATUS
REPORT 7 (“[O]nly around 25% of companies disclosed information aligned with more than
five out of the 11 recommend disclosures and only 4% of companies disclosed information
aligned with at least 10 of the recommended disclosures.”).
249
Id.; see also infra note 297 (discussing scenario analysis and its utility in detail).
250
Bolstad et al., supra note 84, at 3.
251
See, e.g., Letter from Jean M. Hynes, supra note 89; Virginia Harper Ho,
Modernizing ESG Disclosure, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2021), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3845145 [https://perma.cc/2QVS-S8ZR].
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S&P 500 companies do not disclose their own (Scope 1) emissions, a relatively
uncomplicated metric.252
Further, voluntary climate reporting is subject to a lower level of scrutiny than
mandatory financial disclosure, which may impact the quality of the information
provided. Among the S&P 500 companies, most sustainability and environmental
disclosures lack external assurance, and the vast majority of external assurance is
done on only a fraction of the information provided.253 As a result of the lack of
third-party audits, investors are hesitant to rely on current climate disclosure
packaged in “sustainability” reports. Under a mandatory framework required by the
SEC, this reporting would be reviewed by SEC staff for compliance.254
III. SOCIETAL HARM OF CLIMATE RISK UNDERASSESSMENT
Two types of harms are generated by the under-assessment of climate risk: (1)
the negative effects of climate change itself, as the mispricing of climate risk in the
present leads to an inefficient allocation of investment capital; and (2) systemic risk
to the financial system. If investors fail to demand risk assessment from companies,
managers may be left unpunished by the market when they build homes and hotels
in hurricane-prone regions too close to the shore or build bridges to withstand a
“100-year-flood” based on a grossly unrepresentative historical record. This
misinvestment imposes costs not just on the company and the investor but on the
communities harmed by collapsing bridges and hotel evacuees.
A. Climate Damage
If the stock market fails to respond to poor managerial decisions like building
in flood plains or mis-forecasting supply chain disruptions, capital will be allocated
inefficiently.255 This is harmful not just to investors, but to everyone who relies on
252

How Much Can Financiers Do About Climate Change?, THE ECONOMIST (June 20,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/06/20/how-much-can-financiers-doabout-climate-change [https://perma.cc/KT9V-VW78].
253
Jon Lukomnik, State of Integrated and Sustainability Reporting 2018, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 3 (2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/03/state
-of-integrated-and-sustainability-reporting-2018/[https://perma.cc/X967-QCGJ] (describing
how 36% of sustainability reports include external assurances and that about 90% of those
assurances pertains to only some data).
254
Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 924, 961–
62 (2019).
255
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 720 (2006) (“Accurate pricing is essential for achieving
efficient allocation of resources in the economy.”); cf. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation,
87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 642–44 (1988) (arguing that “efficient stock markets may be neither
necessary nor sufficient for the proper allocation of capital among corporations” partly
because most capital is raised outside of the equity markets).
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the goods and services these companies provide as well as those harmed by the
externalities they generate. Disclosure of risk enhances “efficiency by improving
corporate decisions relating to which proposed new investment projects in the
economy are selected for implementation and how already existing projects are
operated.”256 The majority of new public company investment comes from internally
generated capital rather than funds raised from investors through financial
instruments.257 Shareholders monitor the allocation of this capital through corporate
governance mechanisms—oversight of managers and directors—rather than projectspecific evaluation, and many of these mechanisms rely on share price as a proxy of
success. As argued by Kevin Haeberle, inaccurate stock prices thwart shareholders
from monitoring management and the use of corporate funds and reduce “the
efficiency with which society allocates its scarce capital.”258
For example, oil and gas companies are currently allocating large up-front
capital to the exploration and development of extraction projects that many argue
are not net present value justified given projections of future demand in a carbonregulated world.259 Were carbon risks to be accurately priced, it is likely that many
of these projects would not be greenlit. One recent report calculates that between
40% and 50% of ExxonMobil’s upstream capital expenditure through 2025 will be
spent on developing fossil resources that will be unsellable in a world that effectively
implements regulation to limit warming to 2°C.260 Nevertheless, once these projects
have been brought online, the expense of development will be a sunk cost. Oil and
gas companies may decide to continue to process and sell fossil fuels at slightly
above cost in order to recoup some, but not all, of the money spent, rather than
abandoning the project entirely. For this reason, the mispricing of carbon risk in the
present inefficiently subsidizes the future production of fossil fuels.261
Similarly, managers unpunished by the market have little incentive to invest in
adaptation measures and may neglect to spend money on elevating their factory,
256

Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
253 (2009).
257
See Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’
Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 138 (2015).
258
Id.
259
Martin & Kemper, supra note 134, at 335.
260
CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF SEPARATION: TRANSITION RISK FOR
OIL AND GAS IN A LOW CARBON WORLD 7 (2017).
261
See, e.g., Andrea Liesen, Climate Change and Financial Market Efficiency, 54 BUS.
& SOC’Y 511, 531 (2014) (“In the state of inefficiency evidenced in this research, the stock
market does not correctly incorporate the climate-change-induced systematic risk of
European companies when allocating ownership of capital stock. As the (incorrect) valuation
of financial assets strongly affects the investments in assets in the real economy . . . capital
is allocated inefficiently.”); Robert J. Barro, The Stock Market and Investment, 3 REV. FIN.
STUD. 115, 130 (1990) (finding that changes in stock market prices “have a great deal of
explanatory power for the growth rate investment”); see also Kahan, supra note 100, at
1039–41 (explaining that misvalued stock prices can lead to the use of an inaccurate discount
rate in assessing potential investment projects “which, in turn, lead to inefficient capital
budgeting decisions”).
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investing in alternative energy sources, or researching heat-resistant crops.262 Poor
capital-allocation decisions made today will have long-lasting effects, particularly
for projects involving infrastructure construction or purchases of equipment with
long lifetimes and infrequent turnovers.263
B. Systemic Risk
One harm that stems from the failure to assess climate risk is the systemic
nature of the risk itself.264 The primary way that academics and regulators have
discussed the systemic nature of climate risk is through its possibility to cause a
contagion of financial failures.265 If certain industry stocks are indeed overvalued
due to the financial sector’s failure to account for climate risk, the market may
gradually adjust the mispricing in a slow price decline as it incorporates new
information. Or, the market may correct suddenly, resulting in chain-reaction effects
throughout the financial world. The more asset prices diverge from fundamentals,
the higher the likelihood of a large and sudden realignment, a.k.a., a bubble burst.266
A recently published “climate stress test of the financial system” calculated that six
percent of the average investment fund’s equity holdings are in the fossil fuel
262
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 672 (2006); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 118, at 701–02 (“Contrariwise, if the market expects a company to invest in a line of
business that the market believes will be highly profitable in the future, the managers will
feel pressured to make the market-favored investment even if they understand that it is
suboptimal based on their superior, contrarian information.”).
263
See JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY & RYAN JONES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 54 (2015).
264
See KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMATIC
RISK 24 (2006) (explaining that excessive risk taking on the part of networked individual
financial actors can result in societal harms such as bank runs and currency collapse and that
these “excessive costs of risk [] can be shifted onto society at large as a negative externality”);
Michiel Bijlsma, Jeroen Klomp & Sijmen Duineveld, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector:
A Review and Synthesis, CPB NETH. BUREAU FOR ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS 24–27 (2010)
(describing how the interconnectedness of the financial sector means that an underpricing of
risk can lead to a systemic risk for the whole sector and constitutes an externality); see also
Dallas, supra note 22, at 267 (linking the financial crisis to short-termism of financial
institutions).
265
Mark Carney, Resolving the Climate Paradox, Remarks at the Arthur Burns
Memorial Lecture in Berlin (Sept. 22, 2016) (transcript available in the Bank of England
online) (“Minsky moment”); Steele, supra note 238, at 136 (“interrelated risks of climate
change can manifest and spread in a variety of contexts, including lending; securities,
derivatives, and commodities dealing, underwriting, trading, and investing; and insurance
underwriting”).
266
See Dallas, supra note 22, at 315; Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development
Made the World Riskier?, 1, 21–23, 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsrch., Working Paper No.
11728, 2005), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w11728/w11728.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YKP9-SU98].
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industry, while an additional thirty-six percent are in “climate-policy relevant”
sectors, including utilities, mining, housing, and transport.267 If each of these
industries has failed to assess and disclose their exposure to climate risk, this
amounts to a great deal of unaccounted risk that accumulates at the portfolio level.268
Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of England, has referenced the need
to avoid “a climate Minsky moment,” cautioning that “sharp changes in valuations”
of energy company securities due to unanticipated market and regulatory changes
can have domino-effects throughout the financial sector.269 Several heads of other
central banks agree with him that a “sudden collapse in asset prices” is possible.270
Sarah Breeden, the head of International Banks Supervisor at the Bank of England,
has said that transition risk alone could constitute up to a $20 trillion loss to the
financial system.271 Particular attention has been paid to the risks of a bubble in the
coastal housing market, and relatedly, the municipal bond market.272
There have been attempts at predicting how the financial sector will react to
climate-induced economic losses.273 One recent paper models how climate change
induced reduction in labor productivity and capital stock could impact the stability

267

Stefano Battiston, Antoine Mandel, Irene Monasterolo, Franziska Schütze &
Gabriele Visentin, A Climate Stress-test of the Financial System, 7 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 283, 283–84 (2017).
268
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (explaining that
systemic risk can derive from aggregate risk taking on the part of many individuals because
“like a tragedy of the commons, no individual market participant has sufficient incentive,
absent regulation, to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to other
participants and third parties”).
269
Carney, supra note 265; HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY
(2008).
270
Mark Carney, François Villeroy de Galhau & Frank Elderson, Opinion, The
Financial Sector Must Be at the Heart of Tackling Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
17, 2019, 1:00PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/17/thefinancial-sector-must-be-at-the-heart-of-tackling-climate-change [https://perma.cc/PBB2TEPZ]; see also GLENN D. RUDEBUSCH, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2019) (“climate-based risk could threaten the stability of the
financial system as a whole.”); Margherita Giuzio, Dejan Krusec, Anouk Levels, Ana Sofia
Melo, Katri Mikkonen & Petya Radulova, Climate Change and Financial Stability, FIN.
STABILITY REV. (2019).
271
See Sarah Breeden, Avoiding the Storm: Climate Change and the Financial System,
Address at the Official Monetary & Financial Institutions Forum in London (Apr. 15, 2019).
272
See, e.g., Eben Harrell, Are We on the Verge of Another Financial Crisis?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Dec. 18, 2020) (“Tax-advantaged fixed-income instruments, such as municipal bonds, are
a big part of many people’s retirement portfolios (and many insurance companies’ reserves.)”).
273
See, e.g., EUR. SYSTEMIC RISK BD., supra note 40, at 13 (modelling asset revaluation
in response to global 2°C climate policy and finding that “major stock market indexes might
fall by 15–20%”); see also UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE INST. OF SUSTAINBL’Y LEADERSHIP,
UNHEDGEABLE RISK: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE SENTIMENT IMPACTS INVESTMENT 6 (2015).
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of the global banking system.274 In the model, climate impacts increase the frequency
of firm bankruptcies and unpaid loans, requiring banks to be bailed out by
governments, as overall macroeconomic growth slows due to warming.275 Under
such a scenario, this banking instability can lead to financial crises amounting to
30% of GDP.276
The systemic risk literature, however, is limited by its focus on the financial
sector and contagion. Climate change poses a risk to factors of production and to
growth itself (labor, for example, becomes less productive in hotter temperatures).
It, therefore, constitutes a macroeconomic risk that may or may not be labeled
“systemic,” depending on whether that term can be applied to the real economy.
Further, contagion can exist in the real economy—think of the supply chain effects
of a major port being wiped out (or even the 1970s oil crisis).277 Climate risks,
therefore, certainly constitute a systematic risk (as in broadly affecting the economy
and non-diversifiable), even if one remains skeptical of the prospects of financial
contagion.278
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A wide range of proposals have begun to appear for encouraging market actors
to include climate in their assessment of financial risks, including integrating climate

274

See Francesco Lamperti, Valentina Bosetti, Andrea Roventini & Massimo Tavoni,
The Public Costs of Climate-Induced Financial Instability, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 829
(2019); see also Louison Cahen-Fourot, Emanuele Campiglio, Elena Dawkins, Antoine
Godin & Eric Kemp-Benedict, Capital Stranding Cascades: The Impact of Decarbonisation
on Productive Asset Utilization, INST. ECOL. ECON., Paper No. 18 (2019) (modeling possible
cascades of stranded assets that travel through multiple industries and impacting the financial
sector).
275
See id. at 829–30.
276
See id. at 831. Cf. Christina Parajon Skinner, Central Banks and Climate Change,
75 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 17–21) (arguing that banks do not hold
sufficient amounts of carbon intensive credit assets for physical or transition risks to threaten
their solvency in times of stress).
277
Thanks to Onur Özgöde for discussion on this point. See also Onur Özgöde, The
Emergence of Systemic Risk: The Federal Reserve, Bailouts, and the Monetary Government
at the Limits, SOCIO-ECON. REV. (2021) (providing historical overview of the development
of the concept of “systemic risk”).
278
See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH L. REV. 1,
17 (2020); RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 168–70 (Brent Gordon et al. eds., McGraw-Hill Irwin 10th ed. 2011)
(describing the difference between firm-specific idiosyncratic risk, and portfolio-wide
systematic market risk); Jeffrey Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, COLUM. L. & ECON.
(Forthcoming Feb. 14, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814 [https://perma.cc/9VGRYESX].
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risks into prudential regulation and stability monitoring,279 amending fiduciary
duties of CEOs and asset managers,280 and integrating climate risks into central bank
asset purchases.281 The CFTC’s 2020 report on Managing Climate Risk in the U.S.
Financial System alone lists 53 distinct recommendations for regulators to take; A
comprehensive discussion of recommendations is therefore beyond the scope of this
Article.282 One particular intervention, a mandatory climate risk disclosure regime,
has been increasingly demanded by regulators, nonprofits, and investors alike.283
Indeed, a proposed rule on mandatory climate risk disclosure is expected from the
Securities and Exchange Commission by the end of 2021.284 As such, the following
section briefly explores how a disclosure regime might address the market-wide
neglect of climate risks. No amount of disclosure, however, can protect the market
from climate change. The only path toward financial stability requires halting
emissions. Beyond the “market failure” of emissions externalities, there is a limit to
what increased disclosure can facilitate in the face of unhedgeable systemic risks.

279

See Steele, supra note 238; see also Gregg Gelzinis, Addressing Climate-Related
Financial Risk Through Bank Capital Requirements, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (May 11, 2021,
12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2021/05/11/498976
/addressing-climate-related-financial-risk-bank-capital-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/7R
HX-Q36B].
280
Fact Sheet: Modernizing Fiduciary Duty, REGENERATIVE CRISIS RESPONSE
COMMITTEE, https://regenerativecrisisresponsecommittee.org/press/factsheet-fiduciaryduty
[https://perma.cc/2MGK-8BRA]; BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 62; see also Guardrails
to Protect the Commons, SHAREHOLDER COMMONS, https://theshareholdercommons.com/
guardrails/ [https://perma.cc/64F6-PQY2] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
281
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 45; Matthew Razzano, Going Green: The Federal
Reserve’s Legal Authority to Combat Climate Change, HARV. ENV’T L. REV. (Apr. 11,
2020), https://harvardelr.com/2020/04/11/going-green-the-federal-reserves-legal-authorityto-combat-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/U2LN-ZHNK].
282
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17.
283
Simon Jessop & Matthew Green, BlackRock CEO Backs Mandatory Climate
Reporting, Urges U.S. Action, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2020, 10:38 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-climate-change-blackrock-idUKKBN27Q2TS [https://
perma.cc/C3YE-U9YW]; see Press Release, Allison Herren Lee, SEC Comm’r,
“Modernizing” Regulation S-K: Ignoring the Elephant in the Room (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/Q9P25QAX]; Mindy S. Lubber, Requiring Disclosure of Climate Change Risks Makes Sense for
Investors, Companies, and the U.S. Economy, CERES (July 17, 2019),
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/requiring-disclosure-climate-change-risks-makessense-investors-companies-and-us [https://perma.cc/JB2W-S7TG].
284
Public Statement, Lee, supra note 32; Quinson, supra note 32.
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A. Update Disclosure Requirements
As discussed elsewhere, the SEC already has the statutory authority to enact a
mandatory climate risk disclosure regime.285 Issuing climate risk disclosure
regulations falls within the SEC’s self-defined “core mission to promote investor
protection, market efficiency and competition, and capital formation.”286 Systematic
integration of climate risks by financial actors can help prepare corporations and the
broader economy for both the green transition and physical resilience.287 A
mandatory disclosure regime can help overcome both managerial and investor
biases.288 The famous adage “you can’t manage what you don’t measure” holds here:
the very process of collecting information and assessing resilience may help
managers respond to previous underpriced and unaddressed risks.289 Disclosure may
285

Condon et al., supra note 36 (citing Business and Financial Disclosure Required by
Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,915, 23,969-973 (Apr. 13, 2016)
(citing Sections 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a)(10), 77j,
and 77s(a); and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a))); see also CFTC
REPORT, supra note 17, at 93 (“Section 302 of [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002] discusses
disclosure controls including the requirement to establish, maintain, and regularly evaluate
the effectiveness of the issuer’s disclosure controls and to have corporate officers certify that
such controls are in place. Building on this, Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14 require
that the issuer’s principal executive officer and principal financial officer certify that the
financial statements and other financial information included in the report do not omit a
material fact.”).
286
Virginia Harper Ho, “Comply or Explain” and the Future of Nonfinancial
Reporting, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 317, 340–41 (2017) (citing Business and Financial
Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,917,
23,922 & n.6 & n.55 (Apr. 22, 2016)); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The
Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 715 (2006) (asserting that the
essential role of “securities regulation is . . . to facilitate and protect the work of inform[ed]
traders” that leads to the production of more information about firms’ values).
287
J.D. Farmer, C. Hepburn, M. C. Ives, T. Hale, T. Wetzer, P. Mealy, R. Rafaty, S.
Srivastav & R. Way, Sensitive Intervention Points in the Post-Carbon Transition, 364
SCIENCE 132, 132–34 (2019) (arguing that “[r]elatively modest changes to financial
accounting rules or disclosure guidelines regarding climate change risks could have outsized
effects”).
288
See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Cass R. Sunstein & Russell Golman, Disclosure:
Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391 (2014); Choi & Pritchard, supra
note 26, at 60–66 (arguing that because biases may persist even if there is accurate
countervailing information disclosure may need to be supplemented by other regulatory
action such as adjusting the definitions of materiality, creating antifraud liability, or
educating investors).
289
See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal
Risk Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 786–88 (2016) (arguing, in
keeping with a ‘information-forcing-substance theory,’ that disclosure forces managers to
attend to “underlying details” and promotes conversations between directors, officers, and

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782675

116

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

also facilitate the construction and monitoring of ESG metrics and indices designed
to reduce exposure to climate risk.290
However, even under a mandatory disclosure regime, corporate managers
maintain their share-price-based incentives to potentially obscure future risks. The
SEC must develop the expertise to evaluate whether climate-related claims about
the future are misleading, a task that will require a substantial investment in hiring
and collaboration with climate experts. Any mandatory climate risk disclosure
regime has to meet climate science where it is. Regulators must pay particular
attention to the spatial and temporal scales of requested disclosures and ensure they
are both scientifically feasible and tailored to industry-specific needs.291 In
particular, an overemphasis on false precision provided by complicated models
might obscure the usefulness of other methods of risk assessment and
communication.292 This fact should inform how the SEC decides to structure climate
risk disclosure compliance, including balancing the pros and cons of principlesbased versus line-item disclosures.293 In crafting disclosure regulation, the SEC
peers, about risk assessment). Of course, biases may persist even in the face of accurate
countervailing information. See also Choi & Pritchard, supra note 26, at 32 (indicating biases
may persist even in the face of accurate countervailing information).
290
John Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic
Risk (ECGI Working Paper 541/2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3678197 [https://perma.cc/HHN6-ZTLP]; Mahoney & Robertson, supra note 175, at 46–
47. See also Madison Condon, The Sprawling Problem of Financial Greenwashing, in
BUSINESS LAW AND THE TRANSITION TO THE NET ZERO CARBON ECONOMY (Andrea Engert,
Luca Enriques, Georg Ringe, Umakanth Varottil and Thom Wetzer eds., forthcoming 2021).
291
Not all risk assessment requires the use of global climate models, which are in fact
poorly suited to assessing sub-regional and asset-level risk exposures in the near-term. See
Tanya Fiedler, Andy J. Pitman, Kate Mackenzie, Nick Wood, Christian Jakob & Sarah E.
Perkins-Kirkpatrick, Business Risk and the Emergence of Climate Analytics, NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 11, 87–94, 90–92 (2021).
292
Id.; Financial regulators are correct in calling for “future research . . . to go further
and develop models and measures of [climate-related risks] that can be applied to individual
assets.” Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Remarks at the Conference of the Central Banks and
Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System: Research on Climate-Related Risks
and Financial Stability: An “Epistemological Break”? (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bis.org/
speeches/sp190523.htm#_ftn8 [https://perma.cc/9CHD-UMDU]. Climate risk data firms
like Four Twenty Seven—bought by Moody’s in 2019—specialize in this type of short-term
physical risk assessment. See Banks Are Getting Interested in Big Data to Figure Out Their
Climate Risk, MARKETPLACE TECH (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/shows/mar
ketplace-tech/banks-are-getting-interested-in-big-data-to-figure-out-their-climate-risk-2/
[https://perma.cc/E2H8-VV2G]. There may be a need for a government role in fostering this
project, which will require “substantial new investment in high performance computing,
climate model design and a long-term investment in climate science capability.” Fiedler et
al., supra note 291, at 89.
293
SEC Commissioner Allison Herren Lee dissented from the SEC’s recent update to
regulation S-K, arguing that the SEC’s “broad, principles-based ‘materiality’ standard” was
failing to produce the “consistent, reliable, and comparable” information that investors want,
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should draw on climate-related expertise at other federal agencies through
interagency working groups and advisory boards.294
1. Dealing with Uncertainty
Issuers opposed to heightened climate risk disclosure requirements have
sometimes argued that the large amounts of uncertainty around climate change make
forward-looking disclosures impossible or misleading.295 And climate scientists
themselves have warned that reliance on global climate models for pricing shortterm business risk can be misguided.296 Central bank authorities have also cautioned
that due to complexity and non-linearity, potential unknown tipping points, and fattailed risks, macroeconomic models of long-term climate impacts cannot necessarily
be relied upon to target policy goals.297 However, as engineers focused on adaptation
especially with regard to climate risks. Public Statement, Lee, supra note 32. It’s true that
the broad principles-based standard gives managers too much discretion to withhold
information. See supra Section II.B.2. However, some consideration must be made to
whether specific, quantitative line-item disclosures are appropriate for certain forms of
climate risk. This determination must be made in consultation with climate scientists and
accounting experts. In some cases, quantitative disclosures may mask uncertainty, and may
require contextual information like assumptions made, or error bars in order to better inform
investors.
294
See, e.g., EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD (SAB), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sab
people.nsf/WebCommittees/BOARD [https://perma.cc/FF92-UL5W] (last visited Aug. 15,
2021) (In 1978, upon congressional direction, the EPA established the EPA Science
Advisory Board to “advise the agency on broad scientific matters” as well as review
scientific information used for agency programs and regulations); see also Condon et al.,
supra note 36. President Biden has convened an Interagency Working Group on the Social
Cost of Greenhouse Gases that draws from expertise across more than a dozen agencies.
Technical Support Document, Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse
Gases, Interim Estimates Under Executive Order 13990 (Feb. 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TechnicalSupportDocument_So
cialCostofCarbonMethaneNitrousOxide.pdf?source=email [https://perma.cc/C99D-9G4Z].
295
Greg Baer, BankThink: Climate Risk Test Asks Banks to Look Too Far Down the
Road, AMERICAN BANKER (Nov. 30, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/climate-risk-test-asks-banks-to-look-too-far-down-the-road [https://perma.cc/9C4D
-CSE2].
296
Fiedler et al., supra note 291, at 91.
297
BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 3 (citing Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and
Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. OF ENV’T ECON. &
POL’Y 1 (2009); Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. OF ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011)); cf. BOLTON ET
AL., supra note 46, at 24 (“This does not mean that the development of forward-looking
methodologies is not useful. On the contrary, non-financial and financial firms alike will
increasingly need to rely on them to explore their potential vulnerabilities. But for central
banks, regulators and supervisors concerned about the resilience of the system as a whole,
the development of forward-looking, scenario-based methodologies should be assessed with
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have warned, regulators should avoid the conflation of “deep uncertainty as to the
distant future with potentially predictable, uncertainty as to the near future.”298
One means of facilitating disclosure in the face of longer-term uncertainty is
through scenario analysis, which delivers information about risk exposures in
different future possible states of the world without assigning probability to those
futures.299 This method helps to deliver information to investors without glossing
over the high degree of uncertainty when estimating energy sector transitions,
warming pathways, and climate responses. The SEC should consider whether to
construct and provide specific scenarios for companies to report against.300 When
the choice of scenario is left up to issuer discretion, they may choose scenarios
favorable to their prospects: cherry-picking future warming pathways or regulatory
(in)action favorable to their companies’ future.301
a more critical stance.”); M. Alexander Pearl, The (Next) Big Short and the End of the
Anthropocene, 3 UTAH L. REV. 383, 417 (2019) (arguing that climate models parallel models
in the subprime mortgage crisis which often failed of models to adequately incorporate
complexity and systemic risks).
298
James Doss-Gollin, David Farnham, Michelle Ho & Upmanu Lall, Adaptation over
Fatalism: Leveraging High-Impact Climate Disasters to Boost Societal Resilience, 4 J.
WATER RESOURCES PLAN. MGMT. 146, 2 (2020) (pointing out that “successful identification
and prediction of climate on subseasonal to decadal timescales . . . can be used to inform the
development of tools to alleviate the impact of weather and climate hazards”).
299
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, THE USE OF
SCENARIO ANALYSIS IN DISCLOSURE OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2
(2017).
300
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 74 n.5 (“One option for standardizing baseline
projections would be to calibrate a model to a projection from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook. These projections, however, apply only to fossil
fuel-related CO2 emissions and thus would not include projections of other gases and sources
in the United States.”).
301
Kate Mackenzie, The Trouble with Climate Scenarios Is Everyone Has Their Own,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-07/thetrouble-with-climate-change-scenarios-is-everyone-has-their-own [https://perma.cc/XC2CCHKP]. Indeed, the NYAG found that Peabody Energy disclosed the results of only one of
three International Energy Agency scenarios it had analyzed—the scenario with the largest
projected coal demand due to global climate regulation failure. See Press Release, N.Y. State
Office of the Att’y Gen., supra note 128. The investigation found that in its projections of
the future, Peabody frequently referred in public statements to results of only one of the
[International Energy Agency] IEA’s three scenarios for worldwide coal demand: the
‘Current Policies Scenario,’ a status-quo scenario that predicts rising future demand for coal
based on an assumption that governments will fail to adopt any new policies or regulations
to reduce the amount of climate change pollution—even policies and regulations that the
IEA deems governments are likely to adopt. In doing so, Peabody failed to disclose the IEA’s
other two scenarios, which are much less favorable projections of world coal demand by the
IEA. There are also complaints from investors that even when companies use the same
scenarios they often report different types of information gleaned from the analysis, making
it very hard to compare disclosures across companies. Margaret Peloso, Panel 2: The Current
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However, as leading practitioner Margaret Peloso has warned, standardizing
scenarios can also mask uncertainty.302 She notes that the vast majority of U.S. oil
and gas companies reporting under the TCFD framework use the IEA energy
demand scenarios, in part because of investor expectations. These scenarios predict
an orderly transition away from fossil fuels, a “robust” demand for natural gas
through 2040, and largely ignore potential short-term stressors.303 Universal reliance
on one projection of future transition pathways could, in fact, amplify the harmful
effects of a surprised market, rather than diminish them. Peloso encourages thinking
of scenario analysis “as a tool for imagination” in which corporate resilience is
strengthened through the consideration of a wide variety of scenarios: short-term,
long-term, and those that include potential “double black swan” events.304 She warns
that if you “reduce scenario analysis to a cookbook,” you constrain the creative
thinking necessary for imagining the potential for multiple and converging climaterelated risks.305
2. Engaging with Auditors and PCAOB
Securities regulators face a balancing challenge when designing disclosure
regimes: how to give investors the information they need without either
State of Corporate Climate Disclosure and Applications, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://youtu.be/caxY0jIM0b8 [https://perma.cc/8Y7G-WHWT] [hereinafter Margaret
Peloso at Corporate Climate Risk]; CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at 81 (arguing that
regulators “should develop and prescribe a consistent and common set of scenarios and
assumptions” which would allow for “better comparability across results and encourage the
development of universal scenario analysis capabilities”).
302
Margaret Peloso at Corporate Climate Risk, supra note 301.
303
Id. (noting that none of [Peloso’s] clients in the oil and gas industry were using
scenarios that came close to capturing the price-stress experienced by the collapse of OPEC
in early 2020). The IEA’s past scenarios have been criticized for poorly anticipating how
quickly renewable energy became cost-competitive. See, e.g., Simon Evans, ‘Profound
Shifts’ Underway in Energy System, Says IEA World Energy Outlook, CARBON BRIEF (Nov.
13, 2019, 8:20 AM), https://www.carbonbrief.org/profound-shifts-underway-in-energysystem-says-iea-world-energy-outlook [https://perma.cc/8PLS-NJW2]; Gero Rueter, Is the
IEA Underestimating Renewables?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 3, 2018),
https://www.dw.com/en/is-the-iea-underestimating-renewables/a-43137071 [https://perma.
cc/V59Z-JGA2].
304
A “black swan” event, as popularized by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, is an extreme low
probability event that is challenging to predict with traditional financial models. See
Editorial, Black Swans are Difficult to Predict but We Still Need Maths in Finance, CITYAM,
(Feb. 10, 2013, 9:15 PM), https://www.cityam.com/black-swans-are-difficult-predict-westill-need-maths-finance/ [https://perma.cc/5SPN-VG2D] (explaining “[a] black swan is an
event that is so unprecedented it is impossible to predict. Black swans, Taleb argues, are
what matter, yet they are precisely what our best mathematical models are unable to
anticipate. This is a problem for financial modelling, Taleb says.” (citing NASSIM N. TALEB,
THE BLACK SWAN (2d ed. 2010))).
305
Margaret Peloso at Corporate Climate Risk, supra note 301.
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overwhelming them with data or revealing competitive trade secrets. Auditors play
a key role in this balancing act. And while climate change can materially impact
many of the disclosure metrics already required in official financial statements, the
U.S. auditing industry is prey to many of the same myopic drivers discussed
previously.306 Even those companies that voluntarily report under the TCFD
framework, and include climate in management’s discussion of risk, fail to clarify
whether their financial reporting considers these risks.307 The investor advocacy
organization Climate Action 100+ has found that while companies are increasingly
adopting “net zero” targets, very few have allocated internal capital to projects that
reflect these goals.308
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was established
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee the audits of public companies.309
PCAOB Board Member Robert Brown has argued that auditors are failing to include
climate-related risks in their discussions of Critical Audit Matters (CAMs), meant
to point out aspects of the audit that “involved especially challenging, subjective, or
complex auditor judgment.”310 Because climate-related risks to companies are
306

See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay
of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 426 (2006) (noting that Enron and similar
scandals resulted, in part, from conflicts of interest that misaligned the incentives of auditors
to perform their gatekeeping role); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Revealing ESG in Critical
Audit Matters, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 19, 2020)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/19/revealing-esg-in-critical-audit-matters/ [https://
perma.cc/ZL3L-ZLPU].
307
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVS. GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS
FOR PARIS-ALIGNED ACCOUNTS 4 (2020) https://www.iigcc.org/download/investorexpectations-for-paris-aligned-accounts/?wpdmdl=4001&refresh=6113153773aa5162864
0567 [https://perma.cc/FEC5-XY3X] (arguing that “there is little evidence that companies
are taking decarbonisation or the physical impacts from climate change into account as they
draw up their financial statements. This is true even where their strategic report or
management discussion detail climate risks as recommended by the Task Force on Climaterelated Financial Disclosures (TCFD)”).
308
Press Release, Climate Action 100+, Climate Action 100+ Issues Its First-Ever Net
Zero Company Benchmark of The World’s Largest Corporate Emitters (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.climateaction100.org/news/climate-action-100-issues-its-first-ever-net-zerocompany-benchmark-of-the-worlds-largest-corporate-emitters/
[https://perma.cc/RJ59XNN8].
309
See Steven B. Harris, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Remarks on
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Ten Years Later (Sep. 24, 2012),
https://pcaobus.org/news-events/speeches/speech-detail/remarks-on-the-sarbanes-oxley-act
-of-2002-ten-years-later_438 [https://perma.cc/R5SV-2TDZ] (stating that “[the SarbanesOxley Act] established the PCAOB, ending more than 100 years of self-regulation by the
accounting profession”).
310
CAMs provide a means for the auditor to speak directly to the investor, whereas the
rest of the financial statement comes from management and rests on management’s
assumptions. PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., THE AUDITOR’S REPORT ON AN AUDIT
OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION 1,
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“highly dependent upon the particular assumptions used by management,” you
might expect them to be discussed in CAMs covering the reasonableness of
assumptions related to asset lives or commodity prices, yet very few mention
climate.311
The SEC should work together with the PCAOB to encourage auditor oversight
and assurance of corporate climate risk reporting, including that the reporting is
consistent with disclosed financial statements.312 The PCAOB should develop
resources and guidance for assisting auditors in this role and using tools like scenario
analysis. Through its oversight of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the
SEC should ensure that climate risk considerations are included in U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).313 As the Financial Times recently argued,
climate risks may be uncertain, “but so is the time value of money.”314 Making
informed calls in the face of uncertainty is a part of the auditor’s job. There should
be scrutiny as to whether these firms have staff capable of overseeing claims about
emissions reductions, including carbon capture.315

Release No. 2017-001 (Jun. 1, 2017), https://pcaob-assets.azureedge.net/pcaobdev/docs/default-source/rulemaking/docket034/2017-001-auditors-report-final-rule.pdf?sfv
rsn=14ad22c9_0 [https://perma.cc/FEC5-XY3X].
311
See Brown, supra note 306.
312
Samantha Ross, The Role of Accounting and Auditing in Addressing Climate
Change, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS: ECON., 7 (Mar. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/economy/reports/2021/03/01/496290/role-accounting-auditing-address
ing-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/8TJ4-T67S] (arguing that “[t]he commission has not
followed through on the guidance to deliver a meaningful improvement on the depth, clarity,
consistency, comparability, or reliability of disclosure, either in the narrative portion of
companies’ SEC filings or in their financial statements”).
313
The IFRS is proposing to establish a Sustainability Standards Board. If the SEC
were to partner in this project, it could be a step toward convergence of GAAP and IFRS
standards. See Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., Comparability in International Accounting
Standards – A Brief History, https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176
156304264 [https://perma.cc/UB2F-GJF9] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
314
Editorial, Time to Clean Up Climate Reporting Standards, FIN. TIMES, 3 (Feb. 2,
2021), https://www.ft.com/content/4f4a8485-4eed-4228-8ce2-ec199d40829c [https://perma
.cc/6HA5-3KVC].
315
Auditing giant PwC is reportedly planning to hire more than 100,000 employees as
it expects ESG demand to grow. Jessica DiNapoli, PwC Planning to Hire 100,000 over Five
Years in Major ESG Push, REUTERS (June 15, 2021, 3:50 PM MDT),
https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/pwc-planning-hire-100000-overfive-years-major-esg-push-2021-06-15/ [https://perma.cc/GAM9-TPT4] (reporting that
PwC is also increasing trainings on climate risk).
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3. Provision of Climate-Risk Assessment Tools and Data
Information asymmetries are typically thought of in corporate disclosure theory
as one-way.316 But climate risk is a case in which the information breakdown
happens in two directions. Investors do not have information on exactly where assets
are, where suppliers are based, what route supply chains travel over, or what design
specifications were used to build key infrastructure. A manager knows these facts
better than shareholders but doesn’t necessarily understand the predictive science of
climate impacts any better. If behavioral biases and informational transaction costs
are getting in the way of the average company and the average shareholder assessing
their risk exposure, there is a role for regulators to lower these costs of information
acquisition. At the minimum, there should be a website where you can plug in an
address or coordinates and see what sea level rise will be under different levels of
warming or expected number of days over threshold temperatures. Civil society has
begun to fill this void, but the resources and authority of the federal government are
sorely needed.317
The SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) serves as the
SEC’s “think tank” and is tasked with integrating financial economics and data
analytics “into the core mission of the SEC.”318 DERA’s Offices of Risk
Assessments and Data Science facilitate enforcement by “developing analytical
approaches, methods, and models in order to identify trends, risks, or potential
securities law violations in the capital markets.”319 The SEC should build
institutional competency within DERA and its offices, and work with other agencies,
including the Financial Stability Oversight Council, to provide climate-risk
information and assessment tools to investors and the public.320
316

See, e.g., Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory
Securities Disclosure, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 278 (2002) (arguing for mandatory
securities disclosure to address information asymmetries in the wake of Enron).
317
See CFTC Report, supra note 17, at 60 (“The challenge ahead will be to balance
both the public and private objectives in the interests of both transparency and innovation.”);
see also U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RSCH. PROGRAM, OUR CHANGING PLANET: THE U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2020) https://downloads.globalchan
ge.gov/ocp/ocp2020/Our-Changing-Planet_FY-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GEZ-LKXE].
318
DERA is involved in both rulemaking and enforcement, and its duties include
“identifying and analyzing issues, trends, and innovations in the marketplace” and “working
with outside experts in academia and industry to strengthen the Commission’s foundation of
market knowledge.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ABOUT DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK
ANALYSIS,
https://www.sec.gov/dera/Article/dera-about.html#.YT53CQTbri4
[https://perma.cc/2637-6327] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
319
Id.
320
The important question of just what the science of climate forecasting can tell us at
given temporal and geographic scales underlies many avenues of regulation. Just to mention
two: (1) Determining what information can reasonably be demanded of issuers when
designing physical risk disclosure and stress testing requirements; and (2) Monitoring
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B. Limits of Disclosure
While accurate disclosure of climate risks can help make individual companies
and investors more prepared for the physical risks of climate change and can smooth,
and perhaps hasten, the transition to a net-zero economy, it alone cannot correct the
most significant “market failure” of climate change externalities: unregulated
emissions. As Bolton et al. point out: “climate-related risks will remain unhedgeable
as long as system-wide transformations are not undertaken.”321 With supply chain
risks, for example, the knowledge that your local port has a high risk of being wiped
out by a hurricane has limited use when shipping alternatives do not exist.322
However, a better market understanding of the risks of climate change may help to
reduce political opposition to emissions regulations, as market actors become more
aware of the economic costs of failing to regulate emissions.
The CFTC’s report on Managing Climate Risk in the U.S. Financial System
acknowledges that disclosure alone cannot address “the heart of the matter,” which
is unabated greenhouse gas emissions.323 Direct regulation of emissions is
necessary.324 What the CFTC does not note, however, is that direct regulation is
required to address physical risks and adaptation deficits as well, not just mitigation
deficits. A wide range of market actors suffer from the myopic tendencies discussed
climate services providers in the interest of investor protection, checking that consultants and
advisors are not overpromising what science can deliver. FSOC or another centralized
research center within the administration’s financial regulation authority should be tasked
with acquiring expertise in this area that it can then use to advise other agencies. Cf. Hilary
Allen,
Resurrecting
the
OFR,
J. CORP. LAW.
(forthcoming
2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727585 [https://perma.cc/BTZ7-5GKB] (arguing that the Office
of Financial Research should serve as a centralized data hub, assuming its intended role as
central research center for understanding and supporting the regulation of systemic financial
risks).
321
BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 43 (arguing that “current efforts aimed at
measuring, managing and supervising climate-related risks will only make sense if they take
place within an institutional environment involving coordination with monetary and fiscal
authorities, as well as broader societal changes”).
322
See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 237, 253 (2009) (“Issuer disclosure may reduce risk—on average bringing price closer,
on one side or the other, to actual value—but it reduces only unsystematic risk.”).
323
CFTC REPORT, supra note 17, at xix.
324
The CFTC Report’s first recommendation to regulators is to “establish a price on
carbon.” Id. at vi. However, “carbon prices alone may not suffice to shift individual
behaviour and firms’ replacement of physical capital towards low-carbon alternatives until
infrastructures suited for alternative energies are in place. For instance, building an efficient
public transit system may be a precondition to effective taxation of individual car use in
urban areas.” BOLTON ET AL., supra note 46, at 56–57 (citing Signe Krogstrup & William
Oman, Macroeconomic and Financial Policies for Climate Change Mitigation: A Review of
the Literature (IMF, Working Paper No. 19/185, 2019); Id. at 28 (arguing that past energy
transformations were brought about not just by changes in relative pricing, but were also
heavily influenced by socioeconomic, geopolitical, and institutional systems).
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in this Article. Governments have an urgent role to play in ensuring that credit rating
agencies, zoning laws, professional organizations, building codes, and
municipalities are considering and responding to climate risks. Australian insurance
giant Suncorp, for example, has argued for its government to impose “compulsory
adoption” of climate change adaptation plans on corporations.325 It and AIG have
both called for governments to invest resources in climate adaptation, including
flood infrastructure, updated building codes, and longer-term climate adaptation
planning.326 U.S. regulators should consider a program of infrastructure audits.327
Disclosure is further insufficient because individual steps taken to limit the risk
exposure of certain assets may counter-productively contribute to overall risk in the
system. This can happen in both financial markets and the real economy.328
Individual adaptation to climate change, like the construction of seawalls, may lead
to the generation of broader systemic risks. The “levee effect” describes how flood
protection infrastructure can encourage more people to locate in a risky area,
increasing the damage that occurs when the infrastructure fails.329 Relatedly, Zac
Taylor has argued that Florida’s booming insurance-linked securitization market
“defers risk management responsibilities to external capital providers, and by
extension deepens the long-term exposure” of the state economy to climate risk.330
The ability to purchase annual insurance today may encourage development in areas
better left unbuilt. An alternative model, Taylor argues, should emphasize “risk
reduction over risk transfer.”331 Climate adaptation requires planning at the national
level, including plans for managed retreat.332
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C. Shareholders
As discussed supra, firm directors and managers are typically compensated via
stock or stock options in order to incentivize maximization of the share price.
However, as argued by Lynn Stout: “[i]f market prices do not closely reflect actual
expected risks and returns, [a] single-minded focus on share price is a recipe for
mismanagement.”333 Shareholders, as monitors of corporate management, should
examine the metrics by which executive compensation is determined and push for
the removal of those that distort managers away from long-term stewardship.334
Investors increasingly advocate for the integration of climate-related metrics in
executive remuneration.335 According to a 2020 PWC survey, 34% of directors said
they would support linking executive compensation directly to ESG metrics.336
Further, shareholders have the power to influence board composition. Increasing
board competency on climate change may also help to oversee that management is
investigating and disclosing relevant risks.337
Large institutional shareholders should have a particular interest in how climate
constitutes a systematic risk to their portfolios, as these unhedgeable risks cannot be
diversified away.338 These institutions have already been advocating for increased
disclosure of climate risks. While they may not rely on the information to make
trades, they should integrate climate risks into their governance oversight of
portfolio companies. This may include taking a portfolio perspective and seeking
direct mitigation of climate risk itself through pressuring companies to reduce their
emissions.339
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V. CONCLUSION
After the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
directed the (mostly corporate) operators of America’s sixty nuclear power plants to
assess their exposure to flood risk.340 Of these, the Commission found that fifty-four
of the plants were not designed to handle their current flood risks, including nineteen
whose designs could not withstand possible present-day storm surges.341 The
assessment did not extend to consider future climate risks. The rest of corporate
America lacks an industry-focused regulator to mandate hazard assessment, and yet
is similarly exposed to the risks of obsolete designs colliding with a changing natural
world. This Article has sought to expose why climate risks remain unassessed and
unpriced by the market. An updated mandatory climate risk disclosure regime,
designed in consultation with climate scientists and auditing professionals, is a
necessary first step toward preparing the economy for climate change.
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